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Abstract 
 
Income segregation produces unequal social outcomes and has steadily increased 
since the 1970s. High-poverty neighborhoods suffer from low performing schools, fewer 
jobs, an evaporation of local role models (Wilson 1987; Reardon and Bischoff 2011a).  
Recent evidence suggests growing income inequality influences the segregation of 
affluence more than the segregation of poverty (Reardon and Bischoff 2011b). 
Metropolitan areas that display strong population and economic growth are susceptible to 
higher levels of income inequality. I use three unique quantitative approaches to measure 
the segregation of affluence and poverty in a comparison of four metropolitan areas 
exhibiting strong growth to four metros with weaker growth. I find the increase in income 
segregation between 1990 and 2010 is attributable to the increase in the segregation of 
affluence. Weaker metropolitan areas exhibit higher levels of income segregation than 
strong metros due to their significantly higher levels of segregation of poverty; however, 
strong metros exhibit higher levels of segregation of affluence. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Income inequality is rapidly growing in the United States and recently reached its 
highest level since the Great Depression. Between 1980 and 2011, the Gini coefficient for 
household income increased 16%, from .404 to .469 (Fry and Taylor 2012). The growth 
of income inequality shifted segregation research towards income segregation, 
specifically the segregation of poverty (Wilson 1987; Massey et al. 2009). Income 
segregation produces unequal social outcomes; and high-poverty neighborhoods suffer 
from low performing schools, fewer job opportunities, higher crime rates and an 
evaporation of local role models (Wilson 1987; Reardon and Bischoff 2011a).  Although 
most research focuses only on the segregation of poverty, recent evidence suggests 
growing income inequality influences the segregation of affluence more than the 
segregation  of  poverty,  “During  the  last  four  decades,  the  isolation  of  the  rich  has been 
consistently  greater  than  the  isolation  of  the  poor”  (Reardon  and  Bischoff  2011b, 22). 
This thesis focuses on the segregation of poverty and affluence in eight metropolitan 
areas over the past twenty years. 
Income inequality is higher in metropolitan areas than other geographic places in 
the United States (Berube 2014). Furthermore, successful metropolitan areas, those with 
above average economic and population growth suffer from greater income inequality 
(Florida 2003, Brookings 2010). Metropolitan areas with below average growth are likely 
to have more equal distribution of income (Brookings 2010). The largest metropolitan 
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areas are growing faster than other size metropolitan areas and the annual gross product 
of the top ten US metros exceeds that of the bottom 36 states (IHS Global Insight 2013). 
As metropolitan areas capture larger shares of the national population and economic 
output, it is important to investigate how income inequality manifests spatially.  
After a nationwide decline in poverty during the 1990s, a striking development 
occurred in the 2000s: as poverty rates increased, the majority of growth occurred in 
suburban areas, not the urban core. This new geography of poverty in metropolitan areas 
requires more research into the location and patterns of income groups in the United 
States because many of the current place-based policies are not designed to fight poverty 
in this new location. The suburbanization of poverty has broad policy implications that 
affect revenue sharing between levels of government, transportation planning and the 
implementation of social services (Kneebone and Berube 2013). 
To study the relationship between metropolitan growth and income segregation, 
this thesis focuses on four metropolitan areas (Austin, Denver, Seattle, and Washington, 
DC) considered to be economically successful and four metropolitan areas (Buffalo, 
Cleveland, Detroit, and Memphis) with weaker growth in effort to answer: Do cities with 
strong economic and population growth exhibit different patterns of income 
segregation than cities with weak economic and population growth? 
I incorporate two classic approaches, segregation indices and concentrated income 
neighborhoods, to analyze income segregation in the past two decades. In addition, I 
incorporate two local spatial statistics to explore the spatial patterns of poverty and 
affluence within each city. This research uses this multi-method approach to analyze the 
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segregation of fragmented income groups in an attempt to answer: What are the trends 
of residential segregation by income between 1990 and 2010, and how have spatial 
patterns changed during that time?  
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of economic and population growth 
on the segregation of low-income and high-income populations in the past 20 years while 
incorporating classic segregation measures and a new statistical approach to gauge those 
impacts. Harvey (1973) calls for a greater emphasis on the relationship between social 
processes and space,  and  argues  cities  “are  founded  upon  the  exploitation of the many by 
the few” (314). Income segregation is the social process of income inequality taking 
spatial form. This research examines whether successful cities dampen or amplify that 
exploitation. 
This thesis has five chapters: literature review, methods, results, discussion, and 
conclusion. The literature review includes the academic literature that informed the 
project and guided my project design; and a section focused on the history, strengths, and 
shortcomings of residential segregation approaches. The methods section contains an 
explanation of how metropolitan areas were selected, data sources, and how each 
statistical test was performed. The results section outlines the findings from each 
segregation measure. In the discussion, I relate the findings to existing literature and 
finally, in the conclusion, a summary of the findings and suggested avenues of potential 
future research.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
The first part of the literature review focuses on the growth of income inequality 
in the United States, its link to income segregation, and the consequences of segregation 
and concentrated poverty. Subsequently, I examine the prevalence of income inequality 
in metropolitan areas and provide two housing policy examples that illustrate how 
governance contributes to the rise of segregation in United States. Finally, I highlight 
recent research revealing the suburbanization of poverty and the policy implications of 
the changing geography of low-income populations. 
Income Inequality, Segregation and the Underclass 
Income segregation was not a great concern in the United States until inequality 
exploded in the 1970s. The post-World War II economic boom was distributed relatively 
evenly among Americans (Massey et al. 2009; Reardon and Bischoff 2011b). Yet, 
following this period of egalitarian growth, the Gini coefficient1 for household income in 
the United States grew from .395 to .464 between 1973 and 2003 (Massey 2007). By 
2006, inequality was higher than any point since the Great Depression. In the late 1920s, 
the top 10% earned 46% of income and in 2006 the same group earned 45%. These ratios 
amplified even within that small group – the top 1% received 20% in the 1920s and 18% 
of  all  income  in  the  mid  2000’s  (Reardon and Bischoff 2011b). The gap between rich and 
                                                 
1  A  measure  of  income  inequality,  zero  expresses  perfect  equality  while  one  
expresses  maximum  inequality 
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poor exploded and the spatial separation of two income classes manifested spatially – 
affluent households on the periphery and poverty in the center. 
Heightened  levels  of  income  inequality  since  1970  contributed  to  the  rapid  
increase  of  income  segregation  (Massey  and  Denton  1993;;  Jargowsky  1996;;  Massey  et  
al.  2009;;  Watson  2009;;  Reardon  and  Bischoff  2011b;;  Fry  and  Taylor  2012).  Between  
1970  and  2000,  more  than  60%  of  metropolitan  areas  experienced  an  increase  in  
segregation  of  the  rich  from  the  poor  (Watson  2009).  As  inequality  grew,  the  rich  and  
poor  each  grew  increasingly  isolated.  The  percentage  of  families  living  in  poor  or  affluent  
neighborhoods  doubled  from  15%  in  1970  to  31%  in  2010  (Reardon  and  Bischoff  2011a).   
Metropolitan  inequality  is  not  created  equally  and  can  be  measured  in  many  ways  
(Berube  2014)  Criteria  of  income  groups  and  distributions  of  income  are  two  factors  that  
influence  an  inequality  index.  Two  widely  different  income  distributions  may  ultimately  
yield  the  same  inequality  value  because  inequality  can  be  high  when  the  rich  are  
incredibly  rich  or  when  the  poor  are  incredibly  poor  (Berube  2014). 
Income  inequality  does  not  equally  affect  the  segregation  of  poverty  and  the  
segregation  of  affluence.  High  levels  of  inequality  due  to  the  growth  of  a  small  
percentage  of  high-income  earners  can  minimize  the  difference  between  low-income  
households  and  actually  decrease  the  segregation  of  poverty  (Reardon  and  Bischoff  
2011b).  Theoretically,  income  inequality  alone  does  not  result  in  income  segregation,  yet  
a  widening  division  of  income  suggests  a  greater  discrepancy  in  housing  prices  and  
greater  residential  sorting  (Bischoff  and  Reardon  2011a).  In  effect,  affluent  households  
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are  able  to  build  “citadels  of  power…through  the  use  of  social  and/or  physical  means  of  
fortification”  (Marcuse  1997,  315). 
The  growth  of  income  segregation  is  largely  attributable  to  the  growth  of  affluent  
households  (Dwyer  2009;;  Reardon  and  Bischoff  2011a;;  Reardon  and  Bischoff  2011b,  Fry  
and  Taylor  2012).  Reardon  and  Bischoff  (2011b)  find  that  income  inequality  influences  
the  segregation  of  affluence  and  attribute  the  segregation  of  poverty  to  housing  policy  
more  than  income  inequality.  Segregation  of  poverty  may  also  be  attributable  to  the  
reduction  in  low-skilled  employment  opportunities  (Wilson  1987;;  Watson  2009).  High-
income  households  have  grown  faster  than  other  income  groups  in  recent  decades  and  
therefore  occupy  greater  shares  of  metropolitan  areas  (Fry  and  Taylor  2012).  The  
likelihood  of  a  high-income  household  living  in  a  tract  with  other  high-income  
households  increased  by  25%  between  1980  and  2010  (Fry  and  Taylor  2012). 
The  isolation  of  affluent  populations  is  consequential  because  “a  significant  
proportion  of  society’s  resources  are  concentrated  in  smaller  and  smaller  proportion  of  
neighborhoods”  (Reardon  and  Bischoff  2011a,  22).  The  best  schools,  parks,  green  spaces,  
and  other  public  goods  are  isolated  among  the  affluent  (Reardon  and  Bischoff  2011a).  
Arguably,  the  concentration  of  affluence  reduces  understanding  and  apathy  towards  the  
challenges  associated  with  poverty  (Brinegar  and  Leonard  2008).  Potentially  the  most  
drastic  side  effect  of  the  increasing  isolation  of  affluent  populations  is  the  lack  of  
exposure  low-  and  middle-income  households  have  to  affluent  populations.  Although  
income  inequality  is  less  likely  to  influence  segregation  of  poverty,  it  inherently  
 7 
concentrates  poverty  due  to  the  evaporation  of  affluent  households  in  low-  and  moderate-
income  neighborhoods.   
The spatial separation of rich and poor negatively affect low-income groups to a 
greater extent due to the reduction of role models, good schools and work opportunities 
(Wilson 1987; Dwyer 2009; Lichter et al. 2012). Concentrating poverty concentrates 
single mothers, alcoholism and drug abuse (Massey and Denton 1993). The lack of strong 
social capital diminishes the opportunities for young people born into these 
neighborhoods because the networks within their communities are limited (Putnam 
2000). The concentration of poverty received significant attention in the second half of 
the 20th century as many Americans prospered in suburban areas, but many were left 
behind, both economically and geographically.  
Jobs left the urban core and few opportunities remained for citizens on the lowest 
rung of the economic ladder. People with financial ability to flee central cities did so in 
favor of better schools, lower taxes and the affordability of home ownership (Freeman 
2010). This development reinforced racial segregation and promoted the concentration of 
poverty in central cities. The growth of low-income families and evaporation of middle-
income families increased demand for social services; local governments were forced to 
cut services or raise taxes, either of which promoted additional inner city decay and 
population loss (Massey and Denton 1993; Joassart-Marcelli et al. 2008).  Between 1970 
and 1990 high poverty neighborhoods2 increased from 4.1 to 8 million (Massey et al. 
1994; Jargowsky 1996). Simply, there were more poor people occupying more poor 
places. The group enveloped in this staggering concentration of poverty is the underclass. 
                                                 
2  a  census  tract  with  a  poverty  rate  of  40  percent  or  higher 
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The underclass is a group immersed in poverty struggling from the limitations 
associated with their surroundings. Ricketts and Sawhill (1988) describe the underclass as 
having four common characteristics: 1) high drop-out rates for high school students, 2) 
high percentage of single-mother households, 3) high number of able bodied men not in 
the work force, and 4) a high proportion of households relying on public assistance. The 
underclass, and the tribulations of concentrated poverty were the bases to income 
segregation research. 
Two  seminal  works,  William  Julius  Wilson’s  The Truly Disadvantaged (1987), 
and  Doug  Massey  and  Nancy  Denton’s  American Aparthied (1993), are the foundation 
for much of today’s research focused on the underclass, segregation and economic 
opportunity for disadvantaged populations in urban areas. Their work piqued the interest 
of scholars and has fueled two decades of questions pertaining to the plight of 
disadvantaged groups in urban areas. 
Racial segregation dominates United States history. Any discussion of segregation 
without racial segregation is inadequate. The injustice African-Americans faced for much 
of the 20th century extended far beyond residential spaces into schools, buses, churches 
and water fountains. Skin color greatly influenced where a person lived, among other 
things, until the United States Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Massey and 
Denton 1993).  Prior to the Fair Housing Act of 1968, redlining – the practice of lending 
institutions, public and private, limiting or refusing to provide loans in particular areas of 
cities, particularly inner city minority areas – promoted racially segmented pockets in 
American cities (Massey and Denton 1993; Massey et al. 1994). The history of injustice 
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towards African-Americans resulted in many arguing the underclass was confined to the 
ghetto, yet Hispanics and whites each had low-income neighborhoods (Massey and 
Denton 1993; Jargowsky 1996). Despite the injustices toward African-Americans, 
Wilson (1987) contended race was not the driving factor of the underclass. 
William Julius Wilson (1987) argued the underclass was the result of broad 
economic restructuring and the concentration of poverty should be studied through the 
lens of class, not race. A shift away from manufacturing, low-skilled jobs to service 
industry positions on the periphery left unskilled laborers in the inner city with few 
opportunities. Massey and Denton (1993) reintroduced segregation into the American 
vocabulary  and  agreed  with  Wilson’s  assertion,  yet  argued  what  “made  it  a  
disproportionately black underclass  was  racial  segregation”  (137). 
Wilson (1987) believed the outmigration of middle class black families from 
previously economically heterogeneous black neighborhoods left behind poor black 
families in the inner city. Wilson studied neighborhoods and families in Chicago and 
noted middle class black families leaving deeply impoverished neighborhoods upon 
securing the financial means to do so. As a result, the concentration of poor families, the 
majority of which were black, remained in economically depressed neighborhoods. 
Middle-income families chose to live in neighborhoods of similar economic class, 
regardless of race, and the result was a socioeconomically depressed class confined to 
inner cities.  
Massey  and  Denton  (1993)  argued  racially  motivated  decisions,  such  as  redlining,  
excluded  African  Americans  from  neighborhoods  and  promoted  the  concentration  of  
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poverty  in  the  inner  city  (Massey  et  al.  1994).  Massey  and  Denton  (1993)  acknowledge  
Wilson’s  idea,  yet  find  in  their  study,  “(t)he  residential  segregation  of  African  Americans  
cannot  be  attributed  in  any  meaningful  way  to  the  socioeconomic  disadvantages  they  
experience,  however  serious  these  may  be”  (1993,  88).  Blacks  are  more  segregated  than  
whites  of  similar  economic  status  because  black  families  do  not  have  equal  neighborhood  
purchasing  power  (Massey  and  Denton  1993).  Blacks  have  higher  poverty  rates  than  
whites,  and  as  a  result  “racial  segregation  concentrates  poverty,  and  it  does  so  without  
anyone  having  to  move  anywhere  else”  (Massey  and  Denton  1993,  125).  Income  
segregation  inherently  emerges  as  a  result  of  racial  segregation. 
Racial  segregation  declined  in  the  last  third  of  the  twentieth  century,  but  given  the  
astonishingly  high  degree  of  segregation,  the  problem  remained  (Jargowsky  1996;;  
Massey  et  al.  2009).  Jargowsky  (1996)  examined  economic  segregation  within  racial  and  
ethnic  groups.  Income’s  underlying  relationship  between  race  and  ethnicity  affects  
economic  segregation  and  has  a  major  influence  on  the  metropolitan  landscape  (Massey  
and  Denton  1993;;  Jargowsky  1996;;  Watson  2009).  A  high  degree  of  economic  
segregation  within  one  racial  or  ethnic  group  alters  the  economic  segregation  of  the  total  
population.  Jargowsky  (1997)  noted  high  rates  of  poverty  are  common  for  all  racial  and  
ethnic  groups.  He  describes  ghettos,  barrios  and  slums  as  residential  enclaves  for  low-
income  blacks,  Hispanics  and  whites.  Between  1970  and  1990,  economic  segregation  
increased  for  all  three  of  these  racial  or  ethnic  groups,  however,  the  rate  was  not  equally  
distributed  between  racial  or  ethnic  groups.  Income  segregation  of  black  and  Hispanic  
populations  increased  at  a  faster  rate  than  whites  over  the  20-year  period  and  furthermore  
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blacks  and  Hispanics  segregation  levels  grew  faster  in  the  1980s  while  the  majority  of  
income  segregation  for  white  households  occurred  in  the  1970s  (Jargowsky  1996). 
Racial segregation, the segregation of poverty and the segregation of affluence are 
linked in a way that make it challenging to discuss independent of one another, yet 
different processes are at play and the links are far more blurred than they inherently 
appear. The minority populations segregate for vastly different reasons. Moreover, 
despite the link between race and class, different processes influence racial segregation 
and the segregation of poverty. The differences are most apparent when we consider the 
integration processes of these three types of segregation, each would require their own 
unique policy prescription. 
In this thesis, my focus on income segregation is not to diminish the importance 
of racial segregation or its consequences. Class segregation negatively effects the black 
population more than whites (Massey and Denton 1993). Therefore, it is important to 
understand what cities have the lowest levels of class segregation. Racial segregation is 
the result of overt discrimination and personal biases, but socioeconomic status is the 
market’s  influence  in  the  organization  of  urban  areas  (Fainstein  et  al.  1992;;  Jargowsky  
1997). A solution to the segregation of income groups nudges toward a reduction in racial 
segregation. Spatial distance, and barriers to overcome it, inhibits the least advantaged 
populations from opportunity and conflicts with the ideals of democracy and the 
American Dream. I argue segregation by income concentrates the extremes of social 
capital and public good. In a political system where money translates into political power, 
attaining political influence becomes incredibly easy, or impossibly challenging, 
 12 
depending on the neighborhood you live. At the very least, the growth of income 
inequality in the past four decades illustrates the need to investigate income segregation 
in metropolitan areas as the growing income disparity translates into a division of urban 
space  (Fainstein et al. 1992; Ades et al. 2012).  
Low-income  neighborhoods  are  related  to  broader  economic  opportunities  
available  in  the  metropolitan  area  or  larger  region  (Jargowsky  1997,  Cooke  1999).  If  a  
region  is  struggling  from  a  lack  of  jobs  (ie.  manufacturing  in  the  Midwest),  more  low-
income  neighborhoods  are  likely  to  emerge,  “While  the  labor  market  generates  income  
inequality,  the  housing  market  is  the  arena  in  which  the  spatial  distribution  of  that  
inequality  is  determined”  (Jargowsky  1996,  991).  Income  segregation  is  the  result  of  
economic  disparities  within  metropolitan  regions  playing  out  in  the  private  market. 
The growth of income inequality on a national level illustrates the need to 
understand its influence in metropolitan areas. Metropolitan areas with above average 
economic and population growth are susceptible to higher levels of income inequality 
(Florida 2003; Brookings 2010). 
Metropolitan Area Success and Inequality 
Economic value is the most widely accepted barometer for success in the United 
States. Urban policies are continually evaluated in terms of economic value rather than 
social costs (Fainstein 2010). Urban leaders focus on economic growth as their primary 
responsibility, with the belief that growth is the most efficient way to ensure good for all 
members of the community (Fainstein 2010). Any social costs will be corrected when the 
economic ripples of a successful policy broaden the opportunity for all members of the 
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community, or so the thinking goes.  The  measures  of  a  policy’s  ‘success’  rarely  stray  
from economic assessment. Evaluation centers on jobs created, effect on housing prices, 
or  another  measure  of  economic  value,  “the  desirability  of  growth  is  usually  assumed,  
while  the  consequences  for  social  equity  are  rarely  mentioned”  (Fainstein  2010,  2).  The  
idea of economic growth providing the greatest amount of good requires constant 
evaluation. Do cities with strong economies that attract educated workers offer the most 
access to opportunity to all?  
The Brookings Institution (2010) highlights successful metropolitan areas as those 
that exceed the national average in educational attainment, population growth and 
diversity. In the State of Metropolitan American in 2010, Brookings classified nine 
metropolitan  areas  as  the  “Next  Frontier.”  These metropolitan areas attract immigrants, 
families and young workers because of strong, diversified economies and attractive 
climates. The authors note one drawback of these cities’  growth is the widening gap in 
education and income. 
Another popular measure of success in urban literature is creative cities. Creative 
cities are regions of innovation and high-technology clusters that exceed the national 
average in number of people with bachelor degrees; diversity and inclusiveness to all 
races, ethnicities and walks of life; and attract members of the creative class (Florida 
2003). Florida (2003) describes the aforementioned characteristics as the three  T’s:  
technology, talent and tolerance. Cities  with  high  percentages  of  the  three  T’s  attract  
members of the creative class. Creative class members include but are not limited to: 
university professors, scientists, engineers, writers, artists, entertainers, and architects. 
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Members of the creative class place a higher value on where they live than the job itself 
and will move based on lifestyle confident economic opportunities will follow. Creative 
cities are also susceptible to high levels of income inequality 
Metropolitan areas experiencing below average growth and have weaker 
economies are less likely to suffer from high levels of income inequality. The Brookings 
Institution (2010) classified metros below the national average in population growth, 
educational attainment and diversity as    “Industrial  Cores.” These cities have less 
educational and income inequality because they have not attracted new residents and 
continue to rely on industrial employment. Industrial core metros have older populations 
than other metropolitan areas. It is my assumption that the lack of in-migration, combined 
with an older existing population reduces mobility within the metropolitan area and 
makes them less likely to experience an increase in concentration of income groups.  
Population growth is closely aligned with immigrant populations. Immigrants 
constituted more than 11 percent of the United States population in 2000 and play an 
important role in metropolitan development (Singer 2004; Fishman 2005). Immigration – 
the (in)ability to attract immigrants to a city – is  a  key  factor  in  the  classification  of  “Next  
Frontier”  and  “Industrial  Cores”  metropolitan  areas.  The  growing  population  and  above 
national  average  diversity  in  “Next  Frontier”  metros  is  related  to  their  ability  to  attract  
immigrants.  Likewise,  “Industrial  Cores”  lack  of  diversity  and  stagnant  population  
growth in the past 20 years is the result of their inability to attract immigrant population. 
The four metropolitan areas included in this thesis exhibiting strong growth 
patterns  over  the  past  20  years,  Austin,  Denver,  Seattle,  and  Washington,  DC,  are  “Next  
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Frontier”  metropolitan  areas  and  creative  cities.  Each  of these metropolitan areas has had 
high immigration rates since the 1980s (Singer 2004). The four metropolitan areas 
included in this thesis exhibiting weaker growth, Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, and 
Memphis,  are  “Industrial  Cores”  metropolitan  areas.  These  metropolitan  areas, aside 
from Memphis, have low immigration rates after periods of high immigration in the early 
20th Century. 
Government is not an autonomous bystander to metropolitan development or 
income disparities (Fainstein et al. 1992). The ability and ease with which affluent 
populations are able to segregate from those in poverty is strongly influenced by 
legislative action. Many of the policies promoting segregation were racially centered, but 
their  legacy  remains  imprinted  on  today’s  metropolitan  landscape.  Their proliferation is 
visible  through  the  dichotomous  locations  of  the  rich  and  poor.  The  federal  government’s  
homeownership policies in the middle of the 20th century targeted a particular class, race 
and location that continue to influence the metropolitan landscape. The federal 
government promoted homeownership on the periphery and simultaneously fostered the 
concentration of poverty through high-density housing projects for low-income families 
(Massey and Denton 1993). The FHA legalized redlining and encouraged racially 
homogenous neighborhoods. Combined with Urban Renewal and the Interstate, whites 
moved to suburban areas as blacks were relegated to inner cities. Today, the mortgage 
interest deduction continues to incentivize economically homogenous neighborhoods. 
Given the lack of research on the segregation of affluence, the following section 
illustrates how the federal government promotes a spatial division of social groups and 
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entices  affluent  populations  to  separate.  These  examples  illustrate  how  the  “rich 
command  space  and  the  poor  are  trapped  in  it”  (Harvey  1973, 171). 
Federal Policies and Segregation: FHA and Mortgage Interest Deductions  
No  federal  housing  policy  is  as  impactful  as  the  government  intervention  in  1934:  
the  establishment  of  the  Federal  Housing  Administration.  The  early  policies  and  practices  
of  the  FHA  laid  the  foundation  for  sprawling  metropolitan  regions  that  would  foster  
residential  segregation.  Segregation  is  amplified  through  sprawl  because  suburbanization  
enables  spatial  separation  between  populations  and  it  promotes  outward  expansion  and  
low-density  architecture  (Yang  and  Jargowsky  2006;;  Dwyer  2009).  Subsequent  policies  
only  reinforced  segregation  practices  until  Congress  passed  the  Fair  Housing  Act  in  1968.  
The  Housing  Act  of  1949  (Urban  Renewal)  and  The  Federal  Highway  Act  of  1956,  
coupled  with  the  rise  of  the  automobile  further  supported  suburban  development  (Lamb  
2005;;  Levy  2011).  Urban  Renewal  removed  ‘urban  blight’  to  pave  the  way  for  new  
highways  through  formerly  heterogeneous  neighborhoods.  The  displaced  populations  
were  often  relocated  into  public  housing  towers  that  “brought  about  a  geographic  
concentration  of  poverty  that  was  previously  unimaginable”  (Massey  and  Denton  1993,  
57). 
The Federal Housing Administration was established to boost homeownership, 
aid foreclosure prevention and stimulate residential construction (Massey and Denton 
1993; Hays 1995; Levy 2011). Its primary role to insure home mortgages transformed 
homeownership. Today, a 30-year loan with a 20 percent or less at time of purchase is 
common practice, yet prior to 1934 it was a remote possibility (Massey and Denton 
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1993). The quick success encouraged Congress to continue expansion and create the 
Federal National Mortgage Association, Fannie Mae, establishing a secondary mortgage 
market that provided banks risk aversion and more cash on hand (Hays 1995).  
It was not the insurance that promoted segregation, but the FHA requirements for 
each individual property. FHA-insured mortgages drastically favored new, low-density, 
single-family housing (Massey and Denton 1993; Lamb 2005).  The  FHA’s  valuation  
system placed an emphasis on stability, which in the eyes of the FHA were economic and 
racially homogeneous neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993; Meyer 2000).  Racial 
and ethnically mixed neighborhoods located in the urban centers were devalued (Massey 
and Denton 1993).  FHA mortgages promoted new houses for middle-income, white 
families and actively discouraged supporting multi-family housing. African Americans 
were left in dilapidated housing in central cities, unable to secure loans. The FHA was 
redlining (Saltman 1990). 
The FHA coerced local officials into implementing zoning policies desired by 
federal leaders via a financing mechanism in high demand (Whittemore 2013). 
Homeownership became the instrument for cities to attract people and increase their tax 
base. Homeownership grew from 44 to 63% between 1934 and 1972. Had the FHA 
promoted  mixed  used,  dense  development,  America’s  urban  fabric  would  be  vastly 
different.  
The fragmentation of social groups across urban spaces may be the lasting impact 
of the Federal Housing Administration. Through homeownership priorities, the FHA 
strongly influenced the organization of race and class in US metro areas; those influences 
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on the metropolitan landscape remain visible today. Redlining is no longer legal but the 
federal tax code, indirectly, continues to incentivize social division. The mortgage 
interest deduction influences housing choices and is the most expensive housing related 
policy in the US federal budget. This tax expenditure contributes to the spatial and 
economic gap between low and high-income populations. The diminished number of 
middle-income households intensifies the importance of neighborhood composition. 
‘Government  housing’  is  not  a  term  of  endearment  in  American  society  and  
generally refers to low-income housing, however, whether it matches the stigma or not, I 
argue most  Americans  live  in  ‘government  housing.’  Owning  a  home  is  considered  a  
symbol of independence and the foundation of the American Dream, yet, the home 
mortgage interest deduction reduces federal government revenues $82 billion annually. In 
comparison, the 2012 budget for the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
was $40.1 billion (OMB 2013a; OMB 2013b). 
Tax expenditures are “provisions in the tax code that provide special tax benefits 
for selected taxpayers” (Baneman et al. 2012, 1). Tax expenditures incentivize people or 
businesses to engage in a particular behavior to reduce taxable income. One type of 
incentive is a deduction, which allows people to subtract specific expenses from their 
taxable income. With a 65% homeownership rate, the home mortgage interest deduction 
is available to the majority of Americans (Callis and Kreslin 2013). 
A range of familial needs and preferences influence people’s  housing  choice,  but  
income is instrumental. Jobs, schools, or transportation may be the deciding factor, but 
except those with extraordinary financial resources, income is the principal factor of 
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neighborhood selection (Reardon & Bishchoff 2011b). As of 2006, more than 70 percent 
of people did not file itemized deductions (Lowenstein 2006). Although many 
homeowners  may  not  take  advantage  of  the  deduction,  it  is  clear  the  rich  do.  “More  than  
80% of taxpayers in the top quintile itemized deduction in 2011, compared with just 16 
percent of those in the bottom four quintiles”  (Baneman  et  al.  2012, 11). Wealthy 
households invest in mansions because the tax code encourages them to direct capital 
there (Lowenstein 2006). According to the Tax Foundation (2006), despite constituting 
less than 9 percent of tax filers, taxpayers with incomes greater than $100,000 accounted 
for almost 40% of the home mortgage interest deduction in 2003. 
The home mortgage interest deduction is not the silver bullet to a middle class 
lifestyle, but the tax code explicitly values homeownership over renting. Although 
roughly  half  of  the  nation’s  homeowners  may  fail  to  capitalize  on  the  deduction,  no  tax  
instrument is in place to incentivize renting. The home mortgage interest deduction may 
not be the reason someone buys a house, but at the cost of over $80 billion per year, it 
greatly subsidizes homeownership and favors the affluent. This economic incentive is 
location specific – affordable only on the periphery in many cities – and contributes to 
the concentration of rich and poor. Homeownership rates influence appraisal values and 
therefore homeowners seeking to protect or increase their greatest financial asset locate in 
homogenous neighborhoods. 
Homeownership in America is suburban phenomenon. Economist Edward 
Glaeser (2011) argues homeownership subsidies and highway investment contribute to a 
socially engineered suburbia and encourages people to flee dense urban areas. Between 
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1940 and 1960, the homeownership rate jumped from 44 percent to 62 percent (Census 
2011). The mortgage interest deduction did not create suburban homeownership, but does 
augment the legacy of preceding federal policies such as the FHA and the Federal 
Highway Act to influence the social division of urban space (Lamb 2005). As 
neighborhoods become more economically uniform, the role of jobs, schools and 
transportation grow in importance. The concentration of public goods in a smaller 
number of neighborhoods increases the value of each place, reinforcing the economic and 
spatial divides. 
Kneebone & Berube (2013) point  out  that  many  ‘place-based’  policies  exist  to  
alleviate poverty. HUD is not alone; it combines efforts with the Department of 
Education, Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Transportation. 
Kneebone and Berube (2013) group these efforts into three categories: improving 
neighborhoods, delivering services and expanding opportunity. These policies try to 
improve physical and economic environments in low-income neighborhoods, provide 
services to the residents, and diversify options for low-income people. The efforts and 
programs, as described by Kneebone and Berube (2013) totaled $82 billion in 2012, 
equal to the home mortgage interest deduction. 
Homes  are  many  people’s  most  valuable  asset  and  eliminating  the  home  mortgage  
interest deduction would be a political challenge, however, an examination of housing 
policy line items reveals the biggest contributor to deficits is not spending. According to 
Kneebone  and  Berube  (2013),  HUD’s  budget  combined  with  all  other  place-based 
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poverty programs equals the cost of mortgage interest deduction, a tax expenditure most 
beneficial to wealthy households.  
The FHA and mortgage interest deduction are two examples of policies that 
contribute to residential sorting and the current organization of urban space. As these 
lasting effects are present, there is also a geographical shift in poverty that requires policy 
makers to assess the effectiveness of current place based poverty programs. After an 
encouraging decline of poverty in the 1990s, poverty rates increased in the 2000s. 
Potentially the most startling revelation about the increase in poverty is that the majority 
concentrated in suburban areas. This shift has broad implications and requires policy 
makers to think about new strategies to meet the needs of suburbanizing poverty. 
The Suburbanization of Poverty, 1990-2010 
A  new  geography  of  poverty  emerged  in  the  1990s.  As  concentrated  poverty  
declined  in  central  cities,  suburban  areas  captured  a  greater  share  of  poor  people.  The  
population  living  in  high  poverty  neighborhoods  declined  by  2.5  million  between  1990  
and  2000,  a  staggering  40  percent  (Jargowsky  2003;;  Cooke  and  Marchant  2006).    In  
addition,  the  total  number  of  high  poverty  areas  shrank  from  3,417  in  1990  to  2,510  in  
2000  (Jargowsky  2003;;  Cooke  and  Marchant  2006).    People  were  not  only  escaping  
poverty  on  an  individual  level,  they  were  less  likely  to  be  surrounded  by  others  in  
poverty.    Berube  and  Frey  (2002)  found  that  51  percent  of  central  cities  in  metropolitan  
areas  of  over  500,000  people  experienced  a  decline  in  poverty,  an  astonishing  shift  from  
the  1980’s  when  poverty  increased  in  over  three-fourths  of  the  same  cities.   
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Amidst  the  good  news,  poverty  increased  in  suburbs  during  the  1990s,  especially  
near  central  cities  and  in  large  metropolitan  areas  (Berube  and  Frey  2002;;  Jargowsky  
2003;;  Cooke  2010).  Despite  total  suburban  population  growing  at  nearly  twice  the  rate  of  
central  cities,  the  share  of  the  poor  population  in  suburban  areas  increased  from  46  to  49  
percent  between  1990  and  2000  (Berube  and  Frey  2002).  For  the  first  time  in  over  50  
years,  the  poverty  rate  in  inner  ring  suburbs  and  the  poverty  rate  in  central  cities  moved  
in  opposite  directions  (Berube  and  Frey  2002;;  Jargowsky  2003).    Although  suburban  
areas  absorbed  a  greater  share  of  the  impoverished  population,  the  poverty  rate  of  central  
cities,  18.4%,  remained  higher  than  the  8.3%  poverty  rate  in  suburban  areas. 
The  suburbanization  of  poverty  insinuates  low-income  individuals  are  moving  
closer  to  opportunity,  but  the  suburbanization  of  poverty  had  little  effect  on  the  spatial  
proximity  to,  and  segregation  of  affluence  (Dwyer  2009).  Although  poverty  grew  in  
suburban  areas,  affluence  continued  to  move  toward  the  periphery.  Data  revealed  a  
reduction  in  the  spatial  distance  to  more  advantaged  populations,  but  the  majority  of  the  
decline  came  between  poor  and  near  poor  populations  (Dwyer  2009).  Poverty  became  
less  concentrated  in  the  1990s  because  of  income  mobility  (Wagmiller  2011).  Income  
mobility  theories  stress  changes  in  poverty  concentration  are  short  term  and  the  result  of  
changes  in  the  economy. 
At  the  turn  of  the  21st  Century,  data  showed  that  the  concentration  of  poverty  in  
America  was  decreasing.  The  number  of  high  poverty  areas  declined  for  the  first  time  in  
30  years  and  the  majority  of  central  cities  experienced  a  reduction  in  poverty  rates  from  
the  previous  decade,  however,  new  concerns  and  problems  emerged  in  the  midst  of  this  
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change.  The  gains  made  in  the  urban  core  were  at  the  expense  of  the  suburban  areas  
(Berube  and  Frey  2002;;  Jargowsky  2003;;  Cooke  and  Marchant  2006).  American  suburbs,  
particularly  the  inner  ring  suburbs  near  the  urban  fringe,  experienced  an  increase  in  both  
total  poor  population  and  poverty  rate.   
Data released in the early 2000s showed the reemergence of concentrated poverty 
(Berube and Kneebone 2006; Kneebone and Garr 2010a; Kneebone et al. 2011; Lichter et 
al. 2012). Between 2000 and 2005-09, poverty levels began to rise again and 10.5 percent 
of poor people lived in neighborhoods with a poverty rate of 40 percent or more, an 
increase from 9.1 percent in 2000 (Kneebone et al. 2011).  
Potentially  the  most  striking  revelation  about  the  increase  in  poverty  is  that  the  
majority  occurred  in  suburban  areas,  not  in  the  urban  core.  The  rise  of  poverty  in  inner  
ring  suburbs  experienced  during  the  1990s  continued.  As  early  as  2005,  data  indicated  
that  1  million  more  poor  people  lived  in  suburban  areas  than  in  central  cities  (Berube  and  
Kneebone  2006),  “suburbs  were  home  to  the  largest  and  fastest-growing  poor  population  
in  the  country”  (Kneebone  and  Garr  2010a,  4).  Population  in  extreme  poverty  
neighborhoods  increased  by  41  percent  in  suburban  areas,  compared  to  17  percent  in  
central  cities.  Overall,  poverty  gains  made  during  the  1990s  were  largely  negated  as  both  
cities  and  suburbs  experienced  an  increase  in  poverty.  Poverty  levels  in  central  cities  did  
not  return  to  pre-1990  levels,  but  the  trend  turned  in  an  unfortunate  direction.  (Kneebone  
et  al.  2011;;  Lichter  et  al.  2012).  As  a  nation,  the  population  living  in  extreme-poverty  
neighborhoods  rose  by  one  third  between  2000  and  2005-2009.    The  population  in  
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extreme-poverty  neighborhoods  rose  more  than  twice  as  fast  in  suburbs  as  in  cities  during  
this  time  period  (Kneebone  et  al.  2011). 
The  suburbanization  of  poverty  does  not  equate  to  a  decline  in  poverty,  an  easing  
of  the  problem  or  a  solution  to  poverty.  Poverty  moving  to  the  suburbs  does  not  mean  
low-income  individuals  have  arrived  in  the  land  of  opportunity,  rather  it  means  
perceptions  about  the  location  of  opportunity  need  to  change.  Kneebone  and  Berube  
(2013)  argue  the  suburbanization  of  poverty  is  neither  good  nor  bad,  only  that  this  new  
geography  calls  for  new  ideas,  approaches  and  initiatives.   
Many  of  the  current  place-based  policies  are  not  designed  to  fight  poverty  in  this  
new  location.  Suburban  jurisdictions  are  experiencing  high  rates  of  poverty  for  the  first  
time  and  these  municipalities  are  not  equipped  to  meet  the  new  challenges.  Suburban  
areas  rely  on  property  taxes  for  revenues,  and  as  lower-income  populations  grow,  these  
revenues  will  decline  as  the  need  for  social  services  rise  (Madden  2003;;  Cooke  2010;;  
Berube  and  Kneebone  2013).  Leaders  must  continually  evaluate  policies  and  the  
implementation  of  policies  to  meet  the  challenges  associated  with  the  suburbanization  of  
poverty.  As  Dwyer’s  (2009)  research  illustrates,  the  suburbanization  of  poverty  has  not  
placed  low-income  populations  in  the  heart  of  economic  opportunity.  Rather,  the  
suburbanization  of  poverty  is  pushing  disadvantaged  populations  into  new  municipalities  
that  now  must  find  ways  to  meet  the  needs  of  a  growing  low-income  population. 
The suburbanization of poverty alters our perceptions and the reality about the 
geography of poverty within metropolitan areas. The new location means low-income 
families are not only occupying new houses and neighborhoods, but also new 
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municipalities. This potentially requires individuals to enroll in new social service 
programs and meet new administrators, if programs for low-income populations even 
exist in these suburban jurisdictions. This geographical shift presents challenges for 
citizens and public officials at all levels of government. 
The metropolitan area is a multi-layered geographic and political boundary; the 
contemporary US city is ‘chaotic  and  random’  (Boschmann  and  Kwan  2010).  Discussing  
the suburbanization of poverty requires a detailed explanation and understanding of the 
changing metropolitan area. As poverty becomes a suburban phenomenon, it is important 
to relay how previous scholars analyzed the changing geography of poverty and affluence 
in metropolitan areas. 
Suburban Typology 
The evolution of United States metropolitan areas during the 20th century makes 
the simple urban-suburban division ineffective. Despite changes, many continue to 
perceive suburbs as home to the nuclear family with white picket fences and fertile 
ground for the American Dream. Much can be said about this transformation, but the 
point is to merely illustrate the  “Leave it to Beaver”  suburban  oasis  is  not true for all 
suburban places and because the clear urban-suburban divide no longer exists, there is no 
simple way to discuss the geography of metropolitan areas. Central city-suburb 
dichotomous analysis does not respond to the array of socio-economic variables in 
metropolitan areas (Lee 2011). Discrepancies between suburbs can, and do, eclipse the 
differences of the central city and suburbs. Suburban areas now compete with one another 
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for jobs, amenities and people, and have diverse populations and functions (Mikelbank 
2004). Categorizing suburban areas as  simply  ‘not  central  city’  is imprecise. 
The Brookings Institution categorizes suburban places based on urbanization rate 
of the counties within a metropolitan area (Broookings 2010; Kneebone et al. 2011). This 
approach divides areas outside the central city as high-density suburbs, mature suburbs, 
emerging suburbs and exurbs. High density suburbs are where more than 95 percent of 
the population lived in an urbanized area in 2000; mature suburbs is 75 to 95 percent; 
emerging suburbs is between 25 and 75 percent and finally; exurbs are areas with 
urbanization rates below 25 percent in 2000.  
Focusing on the physical landscape of high-poverty areas as opposed to 
jurisdictional lines accounts for regional variability across a metropolitan area and eases 
comparative urban analysis (Cooke 2010). Cooke and Marchant (2006) classified 
metropolitan areas based on age and density of the housing stock rather than use 
jurisdictional boundaries (later used by Lee 2011). The Sun Belt has low-density central 
cities (Jacksonville, FL) that appear suburban while inner-ring suburbs in northeastern 
cities (Hartford, CT) share similar housing characteristics to central cities (Cooke and 
Marchant 2006). Many areas outside Hartford appear more urban than areas within the 
Jacksonville city limits. Cooke  and  Marchant’s (2006) approach highlights the challenges 
facing federal officials charged with allocating funds from the federal government to 
address problems on the local level. Cooke and Marchant’s  (2006)  approach  raises  
questions of whether poverty is responsive to physical landscape, jurisdictional lines, 
both, or neither. 
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This project aims to further the understanding of changing suburban realities. The 
research on income groups, and their spatial location, performed in this study potentially 
serve as valuable information to further describe the differences between suburban areas. 
The changing geography of poverty within US metropolitan areas further illustrates the 
complexity of the metropolitan landscape and demonstrates the importance of suburban 
understanding when discussing the changing spatial patterns of income groups. The 
suburbanization of poverty is an example of a spatial socioeconomic change on the 
national level, yet questions remain about the influence economic and population growth 
has on income segregation, specifically, the spatial patterns of affluence and poverty 
within metropolitan areas. 
Hypothesis 
This thesis focuses on four metropolitan areas (Austin, Denver, Seattle, and 
Washington, DC) considered to be economically successful and four cities (Buffalo, 
Cleveland, Detroit, and Memphis) with weaker economic and population growth in effort 
to answer: Do cities with strong economic and population growth exhibit different 
patterns of income segregation than cities with weak economic and population 
growth? 
This research will use a multi-method approach to analyze the segregation of 
fragmented income groups in an attempt to answer: What are the trends of residential 
segregation by income between 1990 and 2010, and how have spatial patterns 
changed during that time?  
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My hypothesis is that stronger metropolitan areas are more segregated than 
weaker growing metropolitan areas. I anticipate the stronger metropolitan areas had lower 
levels of segregation of poverty and affluence in the 1990s than weaker metropolitan 
areas, but that segregation levels increased in stronger metropolitan areas while 
segregation has remained stable over the twenty-year period in weaker metro areas (Lee 
2011). Following the conclusions of Reardon and Bischoff (2011) and Dwyer (2009), I 
predict the segregation of affluence grew in both groups of cities, however, I anticipate 
the rate of growth to be much faster in the strong growing metropolitan areas. As the 
stronger metropolitan areas experienced a significant amount of growth in the past twenty 
years, higher levels of income inequality accompanied this growth. This leads me to 
believe there will be an increase in the segregation of affluence and segregation of 
poverty. 
I anticipate poverty moves toward the urban fringe in the majority of metros, as 
suggested by national trends, and affluent neighborhoods will emerge in areas near the 
urban core by 2010, and continue along the periphery. Stronger metro areas are more 
likely to witness a growth of affluence in the near urban areas because of their ability to 
attract new residents that are highly educated, well paid and seeking a vibrant urban 
lifestyle (Florida 2003). Weaker metros are less likely to experience significant changing 
patterns of poverty or affluence because of their stable populations and lower 
susceptibility to growing income inequality. I believe the weak metros will see a growing 
number of high poverty neighborhoods extending from the central city into the suburban 
areas and that areas of affluence will be concentrated far from the urban center.  
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 Scholars continually wrestle with the best method to measure segregation. The 
proliferation of new methods is never ending. Prior to discussing the methodology I 
incorporated in this study, I believe it is important to provide a brief history of different 
segregation approaches. Also, I point out the limitations of methods of these fundamental 
methods. 
Approaches to measuring segregation 
Segregation is an intuitive idea, yet measuring it is a challenge and too complex a 
problem to analyze in one way (Massey and Denton 1988; Rey and Folch 2011, Ades et 
al. 2012). Residential segregation can be assessed as the degree of spatial separation of 
two groups across an urban space. Generally, segregation is assessed longitudinally in 
one place or in multiple places at one time, yet all segregation measures seek to 
understand location choices of different populations over place or time (Rey and Folch 
2011). 
There are two common approaches used to measure segregation: segregation 
indices and mapping neighborhoods at a particular threshold of poverty and/or affluence 
(Ades et al. 2012). Recently, spatial statistics emerged as a third approach to study 
segregation due to the advancement of geographic information systems, and the 
importance of understanding the spatial processes of residential segregation. Although 
these are the predominant methods, the practices of each approach are not uniform. The 
purpose of the following section is to demonstrate the variety of existing approaches to 
measure segregation and provide context for the methods ultimately selected in this 
study. 
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Segregation Indices 
Familiarity with the term segregation masks the complexities that arise when 
trying to measure it. The most well-known and widely used measure of segregation is the 
dissimilarity index developed by Duncan and Duncan in 1955 (Massey and Denton 1988; 
Rey and Folch 2011; Spivak et al. 2011; Ades et al. 2012). The dissimilarity index 
remained the standard measure of segregation until the 1970s (Massey and Denton 1988). 
Criticism of the index did not necessarily produce a better model, yet did reignite the 
debate of how to best measure segregation. The debate continued until the late 1980s 
when Massey and Denton (1988) identified and evaluated more than 20 segregation 
indices and established five dimensions: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization 
and clustering.  
Each dimension of segregation is measured by a unique index. Evenness, 
measured by the dissimilarity index, describes the distribution of two social groups across 
a study area. The dissimilarity index denotes the percentage of the minority population 
that must change neighborhoods to attain an even distribution. Exposure explains the 
contact one group has with another and represents the average social experience of a 
resident (Spivak et al. 2011). Two indices measure exposure: the isolation index and 
interaction index. The two indices are inverses of one another and sum to 1. The isolation 
index ranges from 0 to 1 and shows the percentage of the neighborhood occupied by the 
minority group. If a study area has an isolation value of 1, the minority group is 
completely isolated. The interaction index illustrates the exposure the minority group has 
with the non-minority group. A lower number illustrates less exposure to the non-
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minority, and therefore more segregation (Spivek et al. (2011). The two indices are 
interchangeable and should be considered equally (Massey and Denton 1988). 
Evenness  and  exposure  are  aspatial,  but  three  of  Massey  and  Denton’s  (1988)  
dimensions are spatial. Concentration measures the amount of physical area the minority 
group occupies within the study area in relation to their proportion of the population. 
Centralization refers to the proximity of the minority group to the core of an urban area. 
Finally, clustering analyzes if minority groups occupy a contiguous area or are dispersed 
throughout the study area. 
Using factor analysis, Massey and Denton (1988) determine evenness and 
exposure explain the majority of the variance among the five measures but given the 
multidimensionality of segregation, each measure provides valuable information for a 
comprehensive understanding of residential segregation. The extensive usage and various 
combinations of these indices demonstrate their acceptance within segregation research. 
Ross et al. (2004) and Ades et al. (2012) used all five dimensions to study the segregation 
of poverty in Canadian metropolitan areas. Others limit their scope and rely on the 
classical dimensions of evenness or exposure in combination with other indices (Lee 
2011; Rey and Folch 2011; Spivak et al. 2011). Finally, Dwyer (2009) studied the spatial 
dimension of segregation and used concentration, centralization and clustering. Despite 
their wide use, there are limitations to the various indices. The first criticism is the 
applicability to measuring income as a variable and secondly, a combination of two ideas: 
some of the dimensions are aspatial, and each produces only a single index value. 
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Massey and Denton (1988) established the five dimensions to measure the racial 
segregation of two groups: black and white. Because income is a variable on a continuous 
scale, applying these measures to income segregation requires dividing income into 
categories such as poor-nonpoor, based off of arbitrary decisions (Jargowsky 1996; Rey 
and Folch 2011). To accounts for  income’s  continuous  nature  Jargowsky (1996) 
developed the Neighborhood Sorting Index (NSI), which compares the standard deviation 
of  an  individual  household’s income to the standard deviation of neighborhood income. 
While the motivation to develop NSI is clear and the model is theoretically 
straightforward, Jargowsky (1996) notes there are data limitations; because the Census 
releases income distribution in categories, assumptions must be made to calculate total 
variance of neighborhoods and households (Watson 2009). Although the NSI offers a 
solution to the categorical problems, it is an imperfect model with data limitations. 
Two additional shortcomings are that segregation indices yield only a single value 
and that they provide limited to no spatial information. First, two of the dimensions – 
evenness and exposure – are aspatial. Second, the single value, a global statistic, is 
problematic for the spatial dimensions of clustering, centralization and concentration 
because the patterns of segregation for the entire study area are aggregated into one 
number. A global statistic provides limited information about the spatial location of 
segregation, “The single index number is the result of many spatial decisions made by 
people far removed  from  the  residents  under  study”  (Rey and Folch 2011, 431). The 
global statistic makes it challenging to understand where segregation is occurring.  
Global tests indicate the segregation of a population across the entire area of study; local 
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tests allow the opportunity to interpret where clusters are taking place (Hong and 
O’Sullivan  2012). Residential segregation is studied through the lens of multiple 
disciplines and although many indices used do not reflect this fact, residential segregation 
is inherently spatial (Rey and Folch 2011). Geography must play a role in segregation 
research (Johnston et al. 2009). 
Map High & Extreme Income Group Neighborhoods 
Mapping concentrated income neighborhoods, the second most common approach 
to studying segregation, makes visualizing the location of concentrated income 
neighborhoods easy. The crux of this method involves identifying neighborhoods with a 
particular percentage of their population in poverty or affluence. Scholars who map 
concentrated income neighborhoods (census tracts) have mostly been concerned with the 
distribution of poverty across an urban area (Jargowsky 2003; Kingsley and Petit 2003; 
Cooke and Marchant 2006; Kneebone et al. 2011; Wagmiller 2011; Lichter et al. 2012).  
Only Brinegar and Leonard (2008) incorporated this approach to the segregation of 
poverty and affluence.  
One criticism of this method overlaps with the indices – establishing  ‘poor’  and  
‘non-poor’ neighborhoods requires subjective decision-making (Ades et al. 2012). 
Further, the thresholds used to classify neighborhoods are inconsistent. Thresholds used 
to identify high-poverty neighborhoods include 30% (Wilson 1987; Kingsley and Petit 
2003; Cooke and Marchant 2006; Wagmiller 2011) and 40% (Jargowsky 2003). Finally, 
others elected to use two thresholds, 20% and 40% to identify high- and extreme-poverty 
neighborhoods. (Brinegar and Leonard 2008; Kneebone et al. 2011).  
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Spatial Statistics 
In addition to the standard approaches, spatial statistics, powered by GIS have 
emerged as a new tool to investigate residential segregation. Spatial statistics respond to 
the  limitations  of  Massey  and  Denton’s  spatial  dimensions  and  provide  a  platform  to  
visualize segregation (Johnston et al. 2009). Given  indices’  inability  to  provide  detailed  
spatial information about where segregation is occurring, Johnston et al. (2009) call for 
scholars focused on residential segregation to place more of an emphasis on spatial 
location,  “[a]  fuller,  more  informative  discussion  of  segregation  levels  need  more 
geography”  (Johnston  et  al.  2009,  91).  This argument centers on the shortcomings of 
global statistics and aspatial indices. Johnston et al. (2009) use the Getis-Ord Gi* local 
statistic to evaluate ethnic segregation in Auckland, New Zealand. Hong and  O’Sullivan  
(2012) use the Getis-Ord Gi* to compare a heuristic algorithm designed to measure 
clustering. Their selection of Gi* illustrates its broad acceptance as a local statistic used 
to evaluate clustering.  
Local statistics are derivatives of global statistics, but used to analyze each spatial 
unit  in  a  study  area.  Anselin’s  Local  Moran’s  I  is  a  local  statistic  of  Global  Moran’s  I  
(Anselin 1995). Global  Moran’s  I  is  a  measure of spatial autocorrelation – it evaluates the 
clustering of both high and low values. In short, it evaluates the relative location of a 
point and its neighbors, in a multidimensional fashion. According to ArcGIS 10.1 help, 
Moran’s  I  is an inferential statistic that should be examined through z-scores and in 
relation to the null hypothesis. A statistically insignificant z-score indicates spatial 
patterns of the dataset are a random process. A statistically significant value indicates 
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either clustering or dispersal beyond random processes. If the z-score is positive, we 
reject the null hypothesis because the high and/or low values are more clustered than can 
be expected from a true random process. However, if a z-score is negative, we can also 
reject the null hypothesis, but in this case because the high and low values are more 
dispersed than would be expected from a random selection. 
Anselin’s  Local  Moran’s  I  is  the  local  version  of  the  Global  Moran’s  I.  Simply,  it  
measures clustering at the local level and indicates, feature by feature, if a census tract is 
positively or negatively correlated with nearby census tracts. The test determines if there 
is a spatial cluster (of high or low values) or spatial outlier based on the expected 
distribution.  
The Getis-Ord General G, an additional global statistic, measures if high or low 
values cluster. The General G is a measure of hot or cold-spots over a space. The General 
G interprets values in relation to the expected value. Higher values than expected reveal 
potential hot-spots, and cold-spots indicate a clustering of low values. Like  the  Moran’s  I,  
the General G is an inferential statistic evaluated in terms of a null hypothesis. The null 
hypothesis of the General G is there is no spatial clustering. If the General G yields a 
significant z-score we are able to reject the null hypothesis; however we reject the null 
hypothesis for different reasons if the z-score is positive or negative. A statistically 
significant positive z-score indicates high values are more clustered than can be expected 
from a truly random sample. Statistically significant negative z-scores indicate the low-
values are spatially clustered more than can be expected from a truly random sample. 
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Getis Gi* is the local test of Getis-Ord General G. The Gi* indicates hot-spots, or 
areas where there is spatial clustering of high values. The test also indicates cold-spots, 
which are areas were there is spatial clustering of low values. This clustering is 
determined by the z-score. A positive z-score indicates clustering of high-values where as 
a low z-score indicates a clustering of low values. 
In the following section, I discuss how I incorporated these methods into my 
research, and describe other key methodological decisions. 
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Chapter Three: Methods 
The methods section is organized as follows: data, explanation of the three 
segregation approaches, and the criteria for selecting metropolitan areas.  The first section 
outlines data collection and manipulation, and specific steps to complete each 
methodological approach. I discuss the data sources, selection of variables, and provide 
detail about addressing the analytical problem of changing census tract boundaries. 
Following is an explanation of the key steps to complete each methodological approach: 
segregation indices, concentrated income neighborhoods and spatial statistics. 
Data 
I used census tract level data from the 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses, and the 
2006-2010 American Community Survey (ACS) to compare the longitudinal changes of 
income segregation across the metropolitan areas of Austin, Denver, Seattle, Washington, 
DC, Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit and Memphis. The 2006-2010 American Community 
Survey serves in place of 2010 decennial census because the Census Bureau no longer 
collects socioeconomic characteristics as a part of the decennial census. 
The number of individuals in poverty and total number of individuals in a census 
tract were the key variables I used for low-income populations. To analyze affluent 
populations, I used household data and considered the top income bracket for each 
dataset to be affluent. For 1990, the top category was household income greater than 
$150,000, and in 2000 and 2010 the top category was household income greater than 
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$200,000.  This  categorization  of  affluence  follows  Brinegar  and  Leonard’s  (2008)  
approach. 
Due to available datasets, low-income and high-income data were collected from 
different sources. The source for low-income data in 1990, 2000 and 2010 was the 
Longitudinal Tract Database (LTDB), available from the Census Bureau. The LTDB is a 
public database hosted on the Census website provided to aid researchers performing 
longitudinal census tract analysis (Logan et al. 2014). The LTDB provides an extensive 
amount of data from the 1970 Census through the 2006-10 ACS, all modified to 2010 
boundaries. 
The LTDB data include individuals in poverty and the population of each census 
tract. Due to the availability of low-income in this dataset, and more importantly the 1990 
and 2000 data being modified to 2010 census tracts, significant manipulation of data for 
low-income data analysis was not required. High-income data, however, required 
significant adjustment prior to analysis. 
Although the LTDB is an extensive dataset, it does not include household income 
or affluence data, therefore my sources of high-income data from 1990, 2000 and 2010 
are distinctive. Each dataset required unique manipulation in order to attain uniformity 
among the three decades and meet the requirement of all statistical approaches. 
Household income data for 2000 and 2010 were collected from the Census website. 1990 
data were collected from the National Historical Geographic Information System from 
the Minnesota Population Center (2011) (used by Reardon and Bischoff 2011b) because I 
was unable able to locate 1990 household income information at the census tract level 
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from the census website. It is not uncommon for scholars to mix data sources when 
performing longitudinal analysis in segregation literature (Reardon and Bischoff 2011). 
The NHGIS includes the complete Summary File-3 dataset.  
The NHGIS 1990 data required the most attention because the original data did 
not include conventional Federal Information Processing – commonly known as FIPS – 
formatting.  Common  FIPS  formatting  is  ‘SSCCCTTTTTT’  where  SS  =  state,  CCC  =  
county and TTTTTT = census tract (Logan et al. 2014). The NHGIS dataset included the 
correct number, but not proper formatting. For example, the NHGIS labels census tract 
‘9.02’  as  ‘902’  but  conventional  formatting  is  ‘000902’.  NHGIS  also  labels  census  tract  
‘902’  as  ‘902’  but  conventional  formatting  is  ‘090200’.  In  an  11-character string, 
placeholders are imperative. The NHGIS also failed to follow conventional FIPS 
formatting for states and counties. The three geographic areas (states, counties, tracts) 
were separated into three columns in the original formatting. I modified each variable to 
match conventional formatting and then concatenated the columns in order to produce a 
conventional 11-character string.  
As  for  2000  and  2010,  data  in  the  ‘Factfinder’  website  application  is  aggregated  to  
the county level. I selected all of the counties within each of the 2010 metropolitan areas 
and acquired income data. I modified each dataset to contain uniform data. I downloaded 
2000 and 2006-2010 data from the Census website; significant amounts of additional race 
and socioeconomic data were included, however, the additional data varied within each 
dataset, therefore, I deleted the superfluous data and my final database included only 
household income and family income for 1990, 2000, and 2010. Household income data 
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are divided  into  categories  such  as,  ‘Households  >  $200,000’.  The  number  of  households  
within each income category is presented as a count variable.  
Although high-income data were not available in the LTBD, Logan et al. (2014) 
provide  a  ‘crosswalk’  Microsoft  Access  database  that  interpolates  data  from  previous  
decades and normalizes it to the 2010 boundary. The crosswalk database requires an 
input table, queries to identify variables, type of variable, and the program completes the 
interpolation. After multiple attempts, I successfully inputted household income census 
datasets from 1990 and 2000 into the crosswalk table for each metropolitan area. After 
successful normalization to the 2010 boundaries, I exported the data from Microsoft 
Access into Microsoft Excel and/or ArcGIS to run the statistical tests. Data from 2010 
did not need interpolation because data were collected at 2010 boundaries. 
A brief aside, although I used count data, a percentage was also included in each 
of the original tables but percentages would be inaccurate if used in the interpolation 
table. I could have retained the percentages for 2010 because it did not need to be 
interpolated, but I believed it was more important to have uniform data in each table to 
ensure later calculations were consistent. To illustrate the difference between data sources 
in their original form, the 2000 data included over 200 records and 2010 data included 
over 500 records. This disparity contributed to the emphasis on uniformity in this 
longitudinal study. 
Tract Boundary Changes: 1990-2010 
Using census tracts for longitudinal studies can be problematic (Jargowsky 2003; 
Logan et al. 2014). Census tracts are neighborhoods that consist of 4,000 people, on 
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average. The Census Bureau draws tracts based on the population and as populations 
change census tracts are dissolved, separated or modified. Various approaches exist to 
address these challenges, but it is crucial to maintain a consistent number of census tracts 
for each period of analysis because altering the number of tracts makes longitudinal 
analysis inconsistent (Jargowsky 2003).  
Changing census tract boundaries create analytical challenges and one approach is 
to purchase the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB) (Tatian 2003; Lee 2011). The 
NCDB contains census data from 1970 through 2000 and normalizes all data to the 2000 
boundary (Lee 2011). I did not select the NCDB as a data source because it does not 
include 2010 data. According to the Census  Bureau’s  website,  the  solution  to  tract  
boundaries modification is areal interpolation. The Census Bureau provides the following 
instruction: where a 2010 census tract is larger than a 2000 census tract, the solution is to 
create a new record (polygon) and assign proportional attributes to the new polygon 
based on the size of the 2010 polygon in relation to the 2000 polygon. The Census 
Bureau provides 2000 to 2010 and 1990 to 2000 Census Tract Relationship Files to aid 
this process. 
In addition to this general instruction, the Census Bureau provides the 
Longitudinal Tract Data Base (LTDB). The LTDB uses areal interpretation to normalize 
historic data to the 2010 boundary. For this reason, I used the 2010 Metropolitan 
Statistical Area boundaries. Logan et al. (2014) write the 2000 to 2010 data comparison 
has a high degree of accuracy but note the 1990 to 2010 data comparison has more 
variability because it relies on land area interpolation. Its commercial counterpart, 
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NCDB, interpolates data based on block group data. Because block groups are smaller 
geographic areas than census tracts, allocating data at this smaller geographic scale 
makes interpolation more accurate. Allocating a percentage of the larger geographic area 
(census tract) reduces accuracy. Logan et al. (2014) do not make clear why there is more 
variability in 1990 than 2000 but I assume the variability is a function of more boundary 
changes due to more elapsed time.  
Segregation Indices 
I used five dimensions of segregation to analyze income segregation in these 
metropolitan areas: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering. 
Evenness is best measured by the dissimilarity index, the classic segregation measure 
developed by Duncan and Duncan (1955). The isolation and interaction indices are both 
appropriate measures of exposure (Massey and Denton 1988).  
The dissimilarity index indicates the evenness of two groups and measures the 
overrepresentation or underrepresentation in a spatial unit. The formula to measure 
poverty is:  
𝐷 =   .5 ∗   ෍ฬ  ൬
𝑝𝑖
𝑃 ൰ − ൬
𝑥𝑖
𝑋൰ฬ   
where pi and xi are the number of poor and nonpoor individuals who live in 
neighborhood i, and P and X are the number of poor and nonpoor who live in the MSA. 
To measure affluence, pi and xi are substituted with number of affluent households and 
number of non-affluent households in neighborhood i, and P is the total number of 
affluent households in the MSA. 
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The isolation index is an experiential measure and indicates the probability that a 
member of particular group shares the same spatial unit with a member of the same 
group. The closer to 1, the more isolated a group is within that particular unit. The 
formula to measure poverty is: 
𝐼𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = ෍൤൬
𝑝𝑖
𝑃 ൰ ∗ ൬
𝑝𝑖
𝑡𝑖൰൨ 
where pi  is the number of poor individuals who live in neighborhood i, P is the 
total number of poor individuals who live in the MSA, and ti is the total number of 
individuals who live in neighborhood i. To measure affluence, pi is the number of 
affluent households in neighborhood i, and P is the total number of affluent households in 
the MSA. 
The interaction index is the second index that measures exposure, and is the 
inverse of the isolation index. When measuring the segregation of poverty, it measures 
the average percentage of nonpoor individuals that share the spatial unit with individuals 
in poverty. The formula to measure poverty is:   
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =   ෍൤൬
𝑝𝑖
𝑃 ൰ ∗ ൬
𝑥𝑖
𝑡𝑖൰൨ 
where pi and xi are the number of poor and nonpoor individuals who live in 
neighborhood i, P is the total number of poor individuals who live in the MSA, and ti is 
the total number of individuals who live in neighborhood i. To measure affluence, pi and 
xi are substituted with number of affluent households and number of non-affluent 
households in neighborhood i, and P is the total number of affluent households in the 
MSA. 
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I performed all three segregation tests using Microsoft Excel and maintained 
separate data tables of poverty and affluence for each metropolitan area. To measure the 
segregation of poverty, I compared individuals in poverty to individuals not in poverty. 
Likewise, to measure the segregation of affluence I compared affluent households to non-
affluent households. A direct comparison cannot be made between households and 
individuals; therefore I was not able to compare affluent versus rich. Studying the 
relationship of both poverty and affluence provides a comprehensive view of income 
disparities. The majority of studies only focus on poverty through the poor-nonpoor 
relationship. Although data limitations prevent a direct comparison, this research does 
focus on both spectrums of the income continuum.  
The three additional dimensions of segregation improve our spatial understand of 
segregation. I originally calculated these variables in Microsoft Excel, as well, yet after 
human error, I determined a more precise tool was the Geo-Segregation-Analyzer, 
designed by Apparcio et al. (2014). This is an open-source application that calculates 43 
different indices. I followed Ades et al. (2012) and used the Absolute Concentration 
Index (ACO), Absolute Clustering Index (ACI), and Absolute Centralization Index 
(ACE). 
The ACO ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the physical space occupied by the 
minority group. A value of 0 indicates minimal concentration, and 1 indicates maximum 
concentration in the smallest geographic places. For poverty, the formula is: 
𝐴𝐶𝑂 = {
ቂ∑ (𝑥௜𝐴௜𝑋 )
௡
௜ୀଵ −  ∑ (
𝑡௜𝐴௜
𝑇ଵ )
௡ଵ
௜ୀଵ ቃ
ቂ∑ (𝑡௜𝐴௜𝑇ଶ )
௡
௜ି௡ଶ −  ∑ (
𝑡௜𝐴௜
𝑇ଵ )
௡
௜ୀଶ ቃ
} 
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where 𝑥௜ is the total population of group X in spatial unit i, 𝑡௜ is the total 
population in spatial unit i, Ai equals the surface are of spatial unit i, X is the total 
population of group X in the metro area, 𝑇ଵ is the cumulative sum of the 𝑡௜ in spatial units 
from 1 to n1, and T2 is the cumulative sum of the ti in spatial units from n2 to n.  
 The ACL ranges from 0 to 1 and indicates how likely the minority group is to live 
in adjoining spatial units. The closer to 1, the higher degree of clustering is present. The 
formula is: 
𝐴𝐶𝐿 = ቐ቎෍
𝑥𝑖
𝑋
௡
௜ୀଵ
෍൫𝑐௜௝𝑥௝൯
௡
௝ୀଵ
቏ − ቈ
𝑋
𝑛ଶ ∑ ∑ 𝑐௜௝௡௝ୀଵ௡௜ୀଵ
቉ቑ  
/ ቐ቎෍
𝑥𝑖
𝑋
௡
௜ୀଵ
෍൫𝑐௜௝𝑡௝൯
௡
௝ୀଵ
቏ − ቈ
𝑋
𝑛ଶ ∑ ∑ 𝑐௜௝௡௝ୀଵ௡௜ୀଵ
቉  ቑ 
 where 𝑥௜ is the total population of group X in spatial unit i, 𝑐௜௝ is the value 
of the cell of the of the total distance between i and j, X is the total population of group X 
in the metro area, 𝑥௝ is the total population of group X in spatial unit j, 𝑡௝ is the total 
population of in spatial unit j.  
Lastly, The ACE ranges from -1 to 1 and measures how likely the minority group 
is to the central city. A negative value indicates the group is dispersed from the central 
city and 1 indicates the group is near the central city; a 0 indicates the group is randomly 
dispersed. The value of 1 is given to all spatial units inside the central city. The formula 
is: 
𝐴𝐶𝐸 = ൭෍𝑋௜ିଵ𝑆௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
൱ − ൭෍𝑋𝑖𝑆௜ିଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
൱ 
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 where 𝑋௜ିଵ is the cumulative proportion of group X in spatial unit i (from 1 to i) 
and 𝑆௜ is the cumulative proportion of surface area of spatial unit i (from 1 to i)  
Despite their value and prevalence in segregation research, segregation indices 
fail to produce a clear spatial understanding about segregation in a metropolitan area. Rey 
and Folch (2011) conclude that segregation measures are affected by changing spatial 
configuration of data far removed from the data under study. For this reason, I use two 
additional methods to visualize the spatial changes of poverty and affluence: map high- 
and extreme-income neighborhoods, and use spatial statistics. 
High- and Extreme-Income Neighborhoods 
I mapped extreme-poverty neighborhoods (40% or greater) and high-poverty 
neighborhoods (20-39%) following the approach of Brinegar and Leonard (2008) and 
Kneebone et al. (2011). I chose to map both thresholds for two reasons: research up to 
this point uses thresholds ranging from 20-40%; incorporating both into this study allows 
my study to be compared with the larger body of research. Second, the difference 
between a neighborhood with 39% poverty and one of 40% is minimal. Including both 
groups make tracking neighborhoods near this threshold over time easier. Mapping the 
two thresholds helps identify anomalies and provides two degrees of concentrated income 
neighborhoods.  
Affluent tracts are identified using the same cutoffs: for extreme-affluence 
neighborhoods are classified as those with 40% or greater affluent households in a census 
tract and high-affluence neighborhoods as tracts with 20-39% of the households in a 
census tract with incomes greater than $150,000 or $200,000, depending on the year. As 
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mentioned earlier, there is little attention on high-income households in segregation 
literature, and I only found one article using this method to study the segregation of 
affluence (Brinegar and Leonard 2008).  
As mentioned earlier, I modified the datasets to include only count variables. I 
manually calculated a poverty rate and an affluence rate for each census tract. I calculated 
the poverty rate for each census tract by dividing the number of individuals in poverty by 
the total population. I calculated the affluence rate for each census tract by dividing the 
number of households in the top income category by the total number of households. In 
my analysis, I present the total number of census tracts classified as high- or extreme 
poverty/affluence. I calculated these numbers in ArcGIS 10.1. 
Spatial Statistics 
Lastly, I incorporated spatial statistics to analyze high and low-income groups in 
the eight metropolitan areas. The emergence of spatial statistics to analyze residential 
segregation is relatively new, thus I included multiple tests in effort to better understand 
segregation in the eight metro areas and also add fresh analytical perspective to a field of 
study that constantly wrestles with the most appropriate way to measure segregation. I 
used  two  global  statistics,  Moran’s  I  and  Getis-Ord G, and two  local  statistics,  Anselin’s  
Local  Moran’s  I  and  Getis-Ord Gi* to analyze clustering of income groups. 
All four of these statistics are standard in the ArcGIS 10.1 Spatial Statistics 
Toolbox. I used the total number of people in poverty and total affluent households 
within each census tract as my variable. Ultimately, I selected total number in each 
census tract over the poverty or affluence rate within each tract because of the 
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suburbanization of poverty literature. The ‘suburbanization of poverty’ refers to more 
poor people living in suburban areas than in central cities despite the poverty rate 
remaining higher in central cities. Given the higher density and higher poverty rates of 
census tracts in central cities, I assumed an analysis of poverty rates clusters in the urban 
core. Selecting the total number of people within each census tract shows where clusters 
of people are in the metro, rather than the clusters of neighborhoods. Further, analyzing 
the number of people rather than neighborhoods allows us to observe if a suburbanization 
of poverty occurs in each metro. It is not my aim to predetermine results to match the 
literature; rather, that my analysis accurately tests previous research and national trends. 
Selecting the total number of individuals in poverty is a better test of the current 
phenomena that is receiving significant attention in academic and mainstream journalism. 
Given the limited research on the geography of affluence in the context of segregation 
studies, any rebuttal on this front seemed speculative and a candidate for additional 
research. 
After identifying the variable, all four spatial statistics require a conceptualization 
of spatial relationship and provides the option of establishing a distance band. Below is a 
screenshot of options: 
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The conceptualization of spatial relationships used in this study was the zone of 
indifference. The zone of indifference assigns an equal weight to all tracts within the 
distance band and then diminishes as it moves away from that polygon (census tracts). 
Therefore finite boundaries are not enacted with the introduction of the distance band. 
I used a distance band of 2500 meters. Selecting the appropriate distance band 
required exploration  and  it  appears  there  is  no  formula  to  select  a  ‘perfect’  distance  band.  
According to ArcGIS help resources, a combination of the k-function test and an 
investigation of the minimum, maximum and average distance neighbors are each 
important factors to evaluate. I also ran exploratory tests with Local Moran’s  I  Spatial  
Autocorrelation, testing distance bands of 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, and 3000 meters, to 
determine which distance band yielded the highest z-score. After evaluating each of these 
factors for all eight metropolitan areas, I selected 2500 meters. The average distance 
between neighbors for the eight metro areas was 2111.6 meters. The average k-function 
maximum clustering was 2625 meters.  Using  the  Moran’s  I  Spatial  Autocorrelation  for  
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distance bands of 2000 and 2500 meters, each metro area had a higher z-score at 2500 
meters, except for Seattle, but the difference was minimal3. 
 Despite running four unique statistical tests, the parameters required for each test 
are uniform. I selected the Zone of Indifference and used 2500 meters as a distance band 
for all four statistical tests. The descriptions and intellectual merit of each analysis were 
discussed earlier. Each of the measures was analyzed at the metropolitan level. Below is a 
summation of how each metropolitan area was selected. 
Metropolitan Area Selection Criteria 
Richard  Florida’s  Creative  Class  in  2002,  his  updated  list  in  2012  and  “The  
Brookings  Institution  “State  of  Metropolitan  American  in  2010”  each  identify  
metropolitan areas with strong economies that successfully attract jobs, an educated 
workforce and employers. I used these sources to develop the groups of metropolitan 
areas included in this study because Florida and Brookings use distinct approaches aimed 
at producing a list of successful, economically thriving, and forward-thinking 
metropolitan areas. 
Austin, Seattle and Washington, D.C. each appeared on all three lists. Denver 
appeared as  a  “Next  Frontier”  city  and  on  Florida’s  inaugural list but not the updated 
release in 2012. However, Boulder, CO – formerly a part of the Denver metro area – is 
one  of  Florida’s  2012 creative cities. Although they are now in separate  MSA’s,  Boulder  
and Denver continue to share planning efforts within the region such as the regional 
                                                 
3  Given  Johnston  et  al.  (2009)  use  of  1000  m  distance  band,  I  also  tested  1000m  and  1500  m  for  Denver.  
However,  the  z-scores  were  significantly  lower  at  this  distance.  My  assumption  is  the  difference  between  
Auckland’s  classification  of  meshblocks  and  US  census  tracts  may  be  the  key  reason.  However,  Johnston  et  
al.  (2009)  did  not  explain  their  reason  for  selection  and  I  therefore  used  the  general  research  on  distance  
band  selection  as  my  guide. 
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transit network, FasTracks. Also, I am conducting my research at the University of 
Denver.  Although  it  is  not  on  Florida’s  2012  list,  I  believe  it’s  proximity to Boulder and 
appearance on the other two lists justifies its inclusion. 
To find a comparison to the successful metropolitan areas, I turned to the 
Brookings Report. “Industrial  Cores”  provide a nearly perfect  ‘opposite’  to  “Next  
Frontier”  metropolitan areas. The metropolitan areas are below the national average in 
growth, education attainment and are less diverse. Additionally, these metropolitan areas 
have less educational and income inequality. 
Austin, Denver, Seattle and Washington, DC are popular immigrant destinations. 
A 2004 report on immigration comparing historic immigrant patterns to current growth 
rates ranked Austin, TX as a ‘pre-emerging’ immigrant gateway; Denver and Seattle as 
‘re-emerging gateways’; and Washington, D.C. as an ‘emerging gateway’ (Singer 2004). 
In sum, each of these metros is experiencing a period of rapid growth of immigrant 
populations.  This  aligns  closely  with  the  narrative  of  ‘Next  Frontier’  metropolitan  areas.   
Three of the four metropolitan areas experiencing below average population and 
economic  growth  are  classified  in  the  same  study  as  ‘Former-gateways’.  Buffalo,  
Cleveland and Detroit attracted immigrants in the early part of the 20th century, but now 
have  low  immigration  rates.  The  lack  of  population  growth  in  ‘Former-gateway’  
metropolitan areas is largely attributed to their inability to attract immigrants. Memphis is 
not included in this report. The discussion on immigrant population in each metropolitan 
area further supports two of the key factors – growth and diversity – in the classification 
 52 
of  ‘Next  Frontier’  and  ‘Industrial  Cores’  metropolitan  areas.  Further,  it  illustrates  the  role  
immigration plays on overall population growth.  
The Brookings Institution and Florida each caution that one shortcoming of 
economic success at the metropolitan scale is higher levels of income inequality. The 
comparison of these two groups provides a good opportunity to study income segregation 
and the relationship of metropolitan strength. This study could potentially highlight 
positive or negative effects success has on low- and high-income populations. The 
consensus on the importance of economic growth led me to believe other metropolitan 
areas would seek to mimic the successful metropolitan areas. For that reason, I believed it 
is important to evaluate income segregation in metropolitan areas considered to be 
successful. In the following section, I present the results of each segregation measure for 
the eight metropolitan areas included in this study. 
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Chapter Four: Results 
This section presents the results of each method used to analyze the patterns of 
poverty and affluence, but first it is important to illustrate the dichotomous growth the 
two groups of metropolitan areas experienced in comparable time periods. First is a 
discussion on population growth between 1990 and 2010, and second, the changes in 
Gross Metropolitan Product in the past five years. 
Following the discussion of economic and population growth, I present the results 
of poverty and affluence separately, but follow the same organizational pattern within 
each income group. Results of poverty are discussed first and the initial data presented 
are the poverty rates for each metropolitan area in 1990, 2000, and 2010. After the 
introductory depiction of poverty within each metro, the remaining portion is divided into 
three sections: segregation indices, high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods, and spatial 
statistics. Within segregation indices, I discuss the result of the dissimilarity and isolation 
indices. The discussion of neighborhood poverty is divided into three groups: high-
poverty, extreme-poverty, and the spatial patterns of concentrated poverty. Finally, within 
spatial statistics section, the results of the four spatial statistics are presented: Global 
Moran’s  I,  Getis-Ord  General  G,  Local  Moran’s  I,  and  the  Getis  Gi*.  The  discussion  on  
the segregation of affluence follows this and is organized in the same structure.  
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Population Growth 
 Population growth is one of the factors the Brookings Institution used to classify 
metropolitan  areas.  The  ‘Next  Frontier’  metropolitan  areas,  which  include  the  successful  
metropolitan areas in this study, experienced a growth in population above the national 
average.  The  ‘Industrial  Cores’  metropolitan  areas  – which include those metropolitan 
areas exhibiting weaker growth – are below the national average in population growth. 
The population totals and growth rates for each metropolitan area are in Table 1 and 
Table 2. The total population, average population, and average growth rate are included. 
 
Table 1: Weaker Growing Metropolitan Areas Population, 1990-2010 
 
 
Table 2: Stronger Growing Metropolitan Areas Population, 1990-2010 
 
 Source: 1990 Census, 2000 Census, and 2006-10 American Community Survey 
 In 1990, the two groups had roughly the same total number of residents, a 
difference slightly more than 110,000 people. However, the stronger metropolitan areas 
increased, on average, by roughly 500,000 citizens per decade as the average population 
increased from 2.24 million in 1990 to 3.15 million in 2010. At the same time, the weaker 
Metro 1990 2000
growth rate 
(1990-2000 2010
growth rate (2000-
2010)
growth rate 
(1990-2010)
Buffalo 1,161,659 1,138,205 -2.06% 1,107,000 -2.82% -4.94%
Cleveland 2,068,045 2,105,448 1.78% 2,044,199 -3.00% -1.17%
Detroit 4,197,092 4,394,866 4.50% 4,298,214 -2.25% 2.35%
Memphis 1,038,562 1,179,978 11.98% 1,273,061 7.31% 18.42%
Total pop 8,465,358 8,818,497 8,722,474
Average pop 2,116,340 2,204,624 4.00% 2,180,619 -1.10% 2.95%
Metro 1990 2000
growth rate 
(1990-2000 2010
growth rate (2000-
2010)
growth rate 
(1990-2010)
Austin 816,641 1,215,827 32.83% 1,592,568 23.66% 48.72%
Denver 1,641,166 2,151,410 23.72% 2,433,756 11.60% 32.57%
Seattle 2,496,830 2,984,177 16.33% 3,295,755 9.45% 24.24%
Washington DC 4,017,817 4,700,220 14.52% 5,311,742 11.51% 24.36%
Total pop 8,972,454 11,051,634 12,633,821
Average pop 2,243,114 2,762,909 18.81% 3,158,455 12.52% 28.98%
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metropolitan areas average population increased by about 80,000 people between 1990 
and 2000 and then experienced a small decrease in average population between 2000 and 
2010. Thus, their average population changed from about 2.12 million in 1990 to about 
2.18 million in 2010. 
Gross Metropolitan Product 
Table 3: Weaker Growing Metropolitan Areas, Gross Metropolitan Product 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 
rate of change 
(2011-2014) 
Buffalo $45.8 $47.1 $47.2 $48.5 5.57% 
Cleveland $108.1 $111.6 $112.7 $116.1 6.89% 
Detroit $199.6 $208.4 $211.0 $218.7 8.73% 
Memphis $64.3 $66.7 $68.3 $71.2 9.69% 
Average $104.5 $108.5 $109.8 $113.6 7.72% 
  Source: IHS Global Insight, US Metros Economies (2013) 
Table 4: Stronger Growing Metropolitan Areas, Gross Metropolitan Product 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 
rate of change 
(2011-2014) 
Austin $91.5 $98.7 $103.2 $109.3 16.29% 
Denver $161.8 $167.9 $173.3 $182.2 11.20% 
Seattle $243.8 $258.8 $268.5 $281.0 13.24% 
Washington, DC $437.2 $446.9 $455.8 $477.5 8.44% 
Average $233.6 $243.1 $250.2 $262.5 12.29% 
  Source: IHS Global Insight, US Metros Economies (2013) 
The different paces of economic growth between the two groups are revealed in 
the gross metropolitan product, as seen in Table 3 and Table 4. The growth rates are not 
as divisive as the population growth rates, but the disparity of average growth rate in the 
past four years is clear. Further, this illustrates the range of economic output of the 
metropolitan  areas  included  in  the  study.  Washington,  DC’s  growth  rate  is  below  
Memphis  and  Detroit,  but  Washington,  DC’s  economy  is  more  than  twice  as  large  as  
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Detroit, and four times the size of Memphis. The growth rates inferred from the 
methodological section are confirmed in the two previous sections. 
 Segregation of Poverty 
Poverty Rate 
Before engaging the results from the segregation measures, the poverty rate for 
each metropolitan area is presented, as well as the trends experienced from 1990 to 2010 
and what patterns emerge between the stronger and weaker growing metros. The poverty 
rate informs the results of segregation measures, is well understood, easy to 
conceptualize, and a familiar reference to contextualize broad trends. Further, it provides 
a link to the relationship between poverty rate on a metropolitan-wide scale and 
segregation. The results are presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Poverty Rates, 1990-2010 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, Memphis had the highest poverty rate in 1990 at 19.2%. 
The four weaker cities had four of the five highest poverty rates of the group. Austin, 
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which had the second highest poverty rate at 15.9%, was the only stronger metro to have 
a poverty rate in the top five. In 1990, the average poverty rate of the weaker cities was 
14%, while the stronger cities average 10.1%. 
At the turn of the century, most of the eight metropolitan areas followed the 
national trend and experienced a decline in poverty (Jargowsky 2003). The poverty rate 
in all four of the weaker metro areas declined, although Buffalo only dropped 0.1%. As 
for  the  stronger  metropolitan  areas,  Austin  and  Denver’s  poverty  rates  decreased,  
Seattle’s  plateaued  and  Washington,  D.C. increased – but maintained its status as the 
metropolitan area with the lowest poverty rate – from 6.5% to 7.4%. As in 1990, Austin 
was the only stronger metropolitan area to have a higher poverty rate than any of the 
weaker cities. Austin had the third highest poverty rate, 11.1%. Again, Denver, Seattle 
and Washington, DC had the three lowest poverty rates of the eight metropolitan areas. 
The average poverty rate of the weaker metropolitan areas dropped to 12.2% and the 
stronger group declined to 8.7%. 
 Between 2000 and 2010, all metropolitan areas aside from Washington, DC 
experienced an increase in their poverty rate. Memphis, 18.6%, and Washington, DC, 
7.3%, remained on each end of the spectrum for the third straight decade. Again, Austin 
was the only metropolitan area within its group to attain one of the four highest poverty 
rates, although this time it ranked third and maintained its edge over Buffalo and 
Cleveland by a mere 0.1%. The weaker metropolitan areas average poverty rate in 2010 
increased to 15.1% and the stronger metros to 10.8% – averages that exceed values either 
group experienced in 1990 or 2000. 
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 All of the metropolitan areas, except for Austin and Memphis experienced an 
increase in poverty rate over the 20-year period. Austin and Memphis had the highest 
poverty rates for each group all three decades but their poverty rates dropped from 19.2 to 
18.6%, and from 15.9 to 13.9%, respectively. Perhaps the most noteworthy change was 
the increases of the perennial bottom three – Washington DC, Seattle, and Denver – 
which saw their collective average increase from 8.2% to 9.8% between 1990 and 2010, a 
trend otherwise  muted  by  Austin’s  2%  decline. 
 Dissimilarity Index 
 The dissimilarity index is a measure of evenness. When used to measure the 
segregation of poverty, it indicates how many low-income people need to move out of the 
neighborhood for it to reflect the  metropolitan  area’s  composition  of  poor  to  non-poor 
residents.  Thus,  the  metropolitan  area’s  poverty  rate  does  inform the interpretation of the 
dissimilarity values. For example, if a metropolitan area has a poverty rate of 15% and a 
non-poor population of 85%, then a neighborhood must have the same composition for it 
to  be  considered  ‘even’  (Massey  and  Denton  1993).  A dissimilarity value of .15 indicates 
the  metro  area  is  ‘even.’  For  context,  in all three decades, none of the eight cities had 
poverty rates higher than 20% or lower than 6%. Based on my review of the literature, it 
seems this key point is frequently lost in the discussion – my assumption is because 
residential segregation scholars frequently engage a macro-scale view, studying multiple 
metropolitan areas with one test and trust imbalances are corrected through sample size. 
The Dissimilarity Index results are in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Dissimilarity Index, Poverty 
 
 
 Data from 1990 reveal a clear split between the stronger and weaker metropolitan 
areas. The weaker metropolitan areas all have a dissimilarity score of greater than .42 
while all metros in the stronger group have scores below .40. Detroit has the highest 
score at .51, with Cleveland closely behind at .50. Aside from Seattle at .31, the disparity 
between the two groups is not especially great; all other metros were greater than .38. 
 Cleveland and Detroit have the highest dissimilarity scores in 2000, each with .46. 
Seattle continues to have the lowest dissimilarity score at .30, but otherwise, the 
remaining five metros fall between .37 and .44. The stronger metros have the three lowest 
dissimilarity scores and the weaker metros have the three highest scores. Memphis (.40) 
and Austin (.41) split from their respective groups. From 1990 to 2000, the dissimilarity 
index for all metropolitan areas, except Austin, decreased. This is potentially related to 
the overall decline of poverty in the majority of these eight metropolitan areas. 
In 2010, Cleveland and Detroit, despite both experiencing decreases, again had 
the highest dissimilarity index scores at .44 and .43, respectively. For the third 
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consecutive decade, Seattle had the lowest dissimilarity index score, .33. The gap 
between the strong and weak metros decreased in 2010, however, the weaker metros 
continued to have higher scores. Denver had the highest dissimilarity index score of the 
stronger metros, .41, tying Memphis, which had the lowest for the weaker metro areas. 
Between 2000 and 2010, the weaker metropolitan areas, save Memphis, saw their scores 
decrease as the stronger metro areas, aside from Austin, experienced an increase.  
Over the two-decade period, all four strong metropolitan areas – Austin, Denver, 
Seattle and Washington, DC – experienced an increase in their dissimilarity scores. In 
that time, the weaker growing metropolitan areas – Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit and 
Memphis – experienced a decrease. To compare the magnitude of the changes, the 
increase experienced in the stronger metropolitan areas was minimal – likely due to the 
decrease between 1990 and 2000. However, the weaker metropolitan areas demonstrated 
a steady decline in their dissimilarity scores over the 20-year  period.  While  Memphis’  
decline was subdued, it is worth noting its relatively low dissimilarity score given the 
high poverty rate. 
Ultimately, between 1990 and 2010, the weaker metropolitan areas have higher 
degrees of unevenness. However, the unevenness declined in the weaker metro areas. On 
the other hand, unevenness increased as the populations and economies of stronger 
metropolitan areas grew. 
Exposure Indices 
The lack of exposure to different income groups can compromise the quality of 
everyday life, economic opportunity and social relations (Ross et al. 2004). The isolation 
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and interaction indices each measures exposure (Massey and Denton 1988). For the 
following discussion I present the isolation index values because it is more intuitive to 
use the index where a higher value relates to higher segregation. The values are listed in 
Figure 3. As discussed in the methods section, the isolation index measures the likelihood 
a member of minority group (in this instance, low-income) lives in a neighborhood with 
another individual in poverty (Spivek et al. 2012). A value of 1 indicates all low-income 
people live in neighborhoods of only low-income people 
Figure 3: Isolation Index, Poverty 
 
 
In 1990, Memphis had the highest isolation value at .34 and Washington, DC had 
the lowest at .14. All of the weaker metropolitan areas had isolation values greater than 
.24 while the four stronger metros had values below .26. The weaker metros had the 
highest three values and the stronger metros had the three lowest values but low-income 
population in Austin (.26) are more isolated than in Buffalo (.25). Overall, the weak four 
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metropolitan areas had an average isolation value of .29 and the stronger metros are 
significantly lower at .19. 
Cleveland and Buffalo had the highest values of isolation, 24, in 2000. Seattle had 
the lowest levels of isolation at .14. Isolation values declined for all metropolitan areas, 
except Washington, DC, during the 1990s. Although Washington, DC increased during 
this time span, its value remained quite low at .15. The most significant change in this 
period  was  Memphis’  decline from .34 to .16. The division between strong and weak 
metros diminished during the 1990s; by 2000, the weaker metropolitan areas average 
isolation value decreased to .21 and the stronger metros dropped to .17. As in 1990, 
Austin stands out among the stronger metropolitan areas with an isolation value of .21; 
otherwise, the remaining strong metropolitan areas have values below .16. Memphis is 
the outlier among the weaker metropolitan areas at .16 while the other weaker metro 
areas are all greater than .22. 
Both groups of metropolitan areas experienced an increase in average isolation 
values. The weaker metropolitan areas increased to .28, just shy of its score in 1990, and 
the stronger metros escalated to .20, eclipsing its previous peak in 1990. In 2010, just as 
in 1990, Memphis and Washington, DC re-emerged as the metropolitan areas with the 
highest and lowest isolation values. Once again, Austin had the highest isolation value of 
the stronger metropolitan areas at .26, the same as Buffalo, the lowest value of any weak 
metropolitan area. In the 2000s, the isolation values of all eight metropolitan areas 
increased. Further, over the 20-year period, each of the strong metropolitan areas 
experienced a stable or increasing isolation value. Denver, Seattle and Washington, DC 
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each experienced an increase during this time span and Austin, which consistently had 
the highest isolation value of its metropolitan peers, had the same value in 2010 as in 
1990, .26. On the other hand, isolation values of the weaker metropolitan areas stabilized 
or decreased. Memphis, Detroit and Cleveland each experienced a decline in isolation 
while Buffalo, which was consistently the lowest of its group, maintained the same value 
over the two-decade span. 
The isolation index responds to changes in the poverty rate. The decline in 
poverty rates in the 1990s accompanied decreasing isolation values. Likewise, there was 
in increase in poverty rate and isolation in the 2000s. Between 1990 and 2010, the weaker 
metros slightly declined while the stronger metropolitan areas increased, however, low-
income populations in weaker metropolitan areas consistently experienced higher levels 
of isolation from non-low-income groups.  
Spatial Segregation Indices 
While the dissimilarity index and isolation index are aspatial, three of the 
segregation dimensions are spatial: concentration, clustering and centralization. Results 
from the Absolute Concentration Index (ACO) are presented in Figure 4.The ACO ranges 
from 0 to 1 and the higher value corresponds with higher segregation. 
All of the metropolitan areas exhibit high levels on concentration in 1990. Five 
metros – Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, Denver, and Washington, DC – share the highest 
value, .91. Memphis has the lowest value, likely due to the high number of poverty in 
large census tracts far from the urban center. There is little separation between the strong 
and weak metros, as all but Austin and Memphis have values between .89 and .91.  
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Figure 4: Absolute Concentration Index, Poverty 
 
 In 2000, the difference between the metropolitan areas diminishes as Austin and 
Memphis each experience an increase in their ACO values. Denver increases to .93 and is 
the highest. Despite increasing from .69 to .79, Memphis continues to have the lowest 
value. All eight metropolitan areas experienced an increase in the 1990s. The strong 
metro areas have an average of .91 and the weaker metros have an average ACO of .89. 
 Denver (.93) and Memphis (.80) remain on either end of the spectrum in 2010. 
Although some metropolitan areas demonstrate a moderate decline, values still remain 
high in 2010, and on average, both groups experienced an increase during the twenty-
year period. The strong metropolitan areas averaged .90 and the weaker metros averaged 
.87 in 2010. 
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 The Absolute Clustering Index (ACI) measures the degree to which poverty 
neighborhoods adjoin one another. The ACI ranges from 0 to 1; the closer a value is to 1 
indicates higher segregation. The results are presented in Figure 5. 
 In 1990, Detroit had the highest degree of clustering and Seattle had the lowest. 
There is a clear division between the two groups in 1990, as the strong metropolitan areas 
had the four lowest values, all below .13, and the weak metropolitan areas all had above 
.13. The strong metro areas averaged .09 and the weaker metropolitan areas averaged .15. 
Figure 5: Absolute Clustering Index, Poverty 
 
 All eight metropolitan areas exhibited a decline in the clustering of poverty during 
the 1990s, likely due to the decline in overall poverty rates experienced during that same 
time. Detroit and Washington, DC continued to have the highest and lowest degrees of 
clustering, respectively; however, the gap between the two groups lessened. In 2000, the 
strong metropolitan areas averaged .07 and the weaker metropolitan areas dropped to .1. 
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 Finally, in 2010, the differenced continued to decline. Washington, DC and 
Denver increased, minimizing the separation between strong and weak metropolitan 
areas. Detroit continued to have the highest value, but the weak metropolitan areas 
average declined to .09 and the strong metropolitan areas plateaued at .07. 
 The final spatial segregation index is the Absolute Centralization Index (ACI), 
which measures the proximity of individuals in poverty to the central city. The ACI 
ranges from -1 to 1; a positive value indicates a high degree of centralization, a negative 
value indicates individuals in poverty are far from the central city, and a 0 indicates there 
is even dispersion throughout the metropolitan area. The one shortcoming of this 
approach is the various size and shape of jurisdictional boundaries. 
 The strong metropolitan areas and weak metropolitan areas both averaged .75 in 
1990. Denver had the highest value at .92, and Austin had the lowest, .61. The other six 
metropolitan areas ACI values range from .71 to .81. 
 There was not a great degree of change between 1990 and 2000 in the 
centralization values. Detroit and Washington, DC each experienced a moderate decline, 
and Austin exhibited the greatest change, an increase of .07, however, the averages of the 
two groups did not adjust significantly. The strong metropolitan areas average increased 
from .75 to .77 and the weak metro areas remained at .75 in 2000. 
 Lastly, in 2010, most of the metropolitan areas experienced a decline in the ACI 
values. Denver remained the highest, remaining at .92 for the third consecutive decade, 
and Cleveland had the lowest value at .65. The strong and weak metropolitan areas 
experienced a decline in their average as a group. The strong metros decline to their 1990 
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average  of  .75  while  the  weaker  metros  dropped  to  .72.  Denver’s  consistently  high  values  
may be the result of a particularly odd shaped central city in comparison to the other 
metro areas included in this study. 
Figure 6: Absolute Centralization Index, Poverty 
 
High- and Extreme-Poverty Neighborhoods 
In this section, I discuss the findings of high-poverty and extreme-poverty 
neighborhoods independent of one another and then offer a holistic interpretation of the 
two groups. Following this is a discussion of the spatial pattern of concentrated-poverty 
neighborhoods. I mapped the concentration of poverty at two different thresholds, 20-
39% (high-poverty) and greater than 40% (extreme poverty). The results are presented as 
percentages of census tracts within each threshold because of the wide disparity between 
total census tracts in each metro. For example, Washington, DC and Detroit each have 
over 1200 census tracts while Austin, Memphis and Buffalo have less than 350. To 
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illustrate, Washington, DC has 22 extreme-poverty neighborhoods and Memphis has 29 
in 2000; although similar total numbers of extreme poverty tracts, that is 9.3% of census 
tracts in Memphis and only 1.6% in Washington, DC. 
Extreme-poverty neighborhoods 
Figure 7: Extreme-Poverty Neighborhoods, as a Percent of Total Census Tracts 
 
 
In extreme-poverty neighborhoods, there is a clear division between the strong 
and weak metropolitan areas for each decade. In 1990, Memphis had the highest, 14.4%, 
of extreme-poverty census tracts. The metropolitan area with the lowest percentage of 
extreme-poverty tracts was Washington, DC, with only 0.8%. The weak four 
metropolitan areas had the four highest percentages of extreme-poverty tracts, all with 
greater than 5.7%. The strong four metropolitan areas all had less than 4.6% of their 
census tracts classified as extreme-poverty. 
 Despite more than a 5% decrease, Memphis had the highest percentage of 
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the lowest percentage at 0.5%. Detroit also experienced a noticeable decline of over 5%. 
The division between strong and weak narrowed, but remained, as the weaker four 
metros all had greater than 3.5% of their census tracts classified as extreme-poverty. The 
strong metros all had less than 2.9%. Between 1990 and 2000, seven of the eight 
metropolitan areas experienced a decrease in the percentage of extreme-poverty 
neighborhoods; only Washington, DC experienced an increase – from 0.8 to 1.6%. 
 For the third consecutive decade, Memphis had the highest percentage of 
extreme-poverty census tracts, and the percentage skyrocketed to 15.1% - the highest for 
any metropolitan area in any decade. Washington, DC again had the lowest percentage 
with 1.5% extreme-poverty tracts. The separation between the two groups reached its 
greatest divide as the weak four metro areas all had higher than 8.8% and the stronger 
metros had less than 5.4% of their neighborhoods classified as extreme poverty tracts.  
 Between 2000 and 2010, seven of the metropolitan areas, excluding Washington, 
DC increased the percentage of extreme poverty tracts. Both groups witnessed a 
significant jump in their percentages during the 2000s, particularly the weaker metros. 
The average percentage of extreme-poverty neighborhoods increased from 5.8 to 11.1%. 
During the same time, the stronger metros increased from 1.5 to 2.6%. Between 1990 and 
2010, seven of the metros areas experienced an increase. Only Seattle (no change) did not 
increase the percentage of extreme-poverty neighborhoods during the two-decade span. 
The numbers in 1990 closely resemble those in 2010. Over the time study period, weaker 
metros, on average, increased from 9.5% to 11.1% while the stronger metros increased 
from 2.2 to 2.6%. The decline in extreme-poverty neighborhoods during the 1990s, which 
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matches nationwide trends, appears to only be a short-term decline in the metropolitan 
areas examined here. 
High-Poverty Neighborhoods 
Figure 8: High-Poverty Neighborhoods, as a Percent of Total Census Tracts 
 
 As shown in Figure 5, Austin’s  rate  of  high-poverty tracts, 22.0, certainly bucks 
the trend between the two groups observed in extreme-poverty neighborhoods but 
following Austin are the four weaker metros, all had percentages higher than 11.4%. 
Washington, DC, 4.8, had the lowest percentage. Aside from Austin, the remaining three 
strong metros had less than 8.5% of their neighborhoods classified as high-poverty. 
In 2000, Memphis replaced Austin with the highest percentage of high-poverty 
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the 1990s, high-poverty neighborhoods increased in all four weak metro areas, likely 
related to the decline of extreme-poverty neighborhoods observed during the same time 
period in all four metros. Only DC experienced an increase in both high- and extreme-
poverty neighborhoods in 1990s. Austin had a significant decline to 13.4%, Seattle 
decreased from 6.1 to 5.4%, and Denver dropped from 8.5 to 7.4%.  
Again in 2010, Memphis had the highest percentage of high-poverty 
neighborhoods, 28.5% - the highest percentage for any metro in any decade. Washington, 
DC, although increasing to 6.2%, had the lowest percentage of any metropolitan area. 
The division between the strong and weaker metros is blurred in 2010. Cleveland is the 
second highest at 22.4% and despite doubling the number of high-poverty tracts during 
the time period, Seattle remains the second lowest at 11.4%, but there is a a cluster 
around 19-20% for the remaining four cities. Overall, all eight metropolitan areas 
increased between 2000 and 2010. Further, aside from Austin, the remaining seven 
metropolitan areas increased between 1990 and 2010. 
 On average, the percentages of high-poverty tracts increased for each group 
between 1990 and 2010. The trends are not equal when comparing the two decades; the 
percentage of high-poverty neighborhoods in weaker metro areas increased roughly 3% 
each decade, however, the stronger metros experienced a much different pattern. After a 
2.5% decline in the 1990s, the stronger metro areas increased 6% between 2000 and 
2010. 
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High- and Extreme-Poverty Neighborhoods 
 Overall, there is a clear difference between the strong and weak metropolitan 
areas in extreme-poverty neighborhoods. The four weak metros have the highest 
percentage in all three decades. In sum, there is a much higher likelihood for a person to 
live in an extreme poverty neighborhood if that person lives in Buffalo, Cleveland, 
Detroit or Memphis. Neither the strong nor weak metros were immune to the growth of 
concentrated poverty during the 2000s after the brief period of relief in the 1990s. 
The high-poverty neighborhoods do not present such a clear division between the 
two groups, particularly in 2010. There is some separation in 1990 and 2000, if not for 
Austin’s  incredibly  high  number  of  high-poverty tracts in 1990. 
 After examining the percentage of extreme- and high-poverty neighborhoods in 
each decade, it is crucial to understand how these trends manifest spatially, and how 
location changes over time. In the following section, I discuss the location of extreme- 
and high-poverty tracts in each metropolitan area between 1990 and 2010. 
Spatial Patterns of Concentrated Poverty 
 Within this section, I explain the spatial patterns of concentrated poverty in each 
metropolitan area separately. The weak metropolitan areas are described first followed by 
the strong metropolitan areas; each group is organized alphabetically. Additionally, high- 
and extreme-poverty neighborhoods are discussed together. If noticeable geographic 
patterns exist for one group in particular, that will be noted, but otherwise I will simply 
refer to the neighborhoods as concentrated poverty neighborhoods. The patterns from 
1990 to 2010 are discussed within each metro area. All maps are in Appendix A. 
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Buffalo 
 High- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods grew each decade in Buffalo. In 1990, 
extreme-poverty neighborhoods were located in central Buffalo, north of Interstate-190 
and West of Interstate-90, and extend northeast. High-poverty neighborhoods surround 
downtown Buffalo. There are also high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods near 
Niagara Falls in the northern metro area. There was little change in the location of 
neighborhoods in the 1990s aside from some slight dispersal from central Buffalo and 
growth near Lockport. Finally, in 2010, the high-poverty neighborhoods expand around 
Lockport and Niagara Falls. Downtown Buffalo also absorbed some of the growth in 
concentrated poverty, primarily near the northern boundary of the city. 
Cleveland 
 In 1990, high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods are throughout downtown and 
central city neighborhoods, extending both east and west as the eastern boundary of high-
poverty neighborhoods extended as far east as East 152nd Street. There are also isolated 
groups in the western part of the metro near Lorain and Elyria. 
 Those isolated groups remain on the periphery in 2000 and experience very little 
change. The concentration near downtown Cleveland remains and the concentration of 
extreme-poverty neighborhoods shift to the south. High poverty tracts continue to move 
east and a new area emerges south of Cleveland around North Randall. In 2010, the 
concentration spreads from downtown – both high and extreme neighborhoods – into 
central city neighborhoods in all directions. Extreme-poverty neighborhoods growth is 
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noticeable to the west near the Lakewood and Cleveland boundary and to the east in East 
Cleveland. Finally, there is a growth near North Randall and Bedford Heights. 
Detroit 
 There is a concentration of high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods throughout 
Detroit in 1990. There is a clear boundary of this concentration along 8 Mile Road to the 
north and Highway 24 to the west. Pontiac, to the northwest of Detroit, has a 
concentration of poverty neighborhoods as does an area to the west around the 
intersection of Interstate-94 and Interestate-275. 
 The northern and western boundaries of concentrated poverty neighborhoods 
remain in downtown Detroit but a significant number of extreme-poverty tracts are 
reduced to high-poverty in 2000. The clustering west of the city and in Pontiac decline 
slightly. In 2010, a large number of extreme-poverty census tracts re-emerge in central 
Detroit. The number of high-poverty tracts moves west and north from the central city. 
The area west of the city appears again and expands beyond its 1990 coverage. 
Additionally, there is a growth of high-poverty neighborhoods in the northeastern part of 
the metro, roughly 40 miles from downtown Detroit. 
Memphis 
 Over  32%  of  Memphis’  census  tracts are high- or extreme-poverty in 1990, 
therefore it is little surprise to find concentrated poverty neighborhoods located 
throughout the Memphis metropolitan area. The western periphery has multiple extreme-
poverty neighborhoods while the tracts found on the eastern periphery are high-poverty 
neighborhoods. This east-west divide remains true near downtown Memphis as a the 
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portion of the city west of Interstate-240 is covered with extreme-poverty tracks and the 
neighborhoods east of the thoroughfare are predominantly high-poverty. The division 
along I-240 becomes even clearer in 2000. High-poverty tracts move south to the 
Tennessee border and north of I-40. The neighborhoods on the eastern periphery diminish 
and those on the western boundary reduce to high-poverty. 
 Memphis’  high- and extreme-poverty neighborhood eclipse 40% in 2010 and the 
boundaries of the metropolitan area absorb some of this growth, but to a lesser extent 
than in 1990. Near downtown extreme-poverty neighborhoods increase and high-poverty 
neighborhoods emerge. The extreme-poverty tracts appear east of I-240 along I-40 and 
both north and south of the city. The most noticeable change is the growth of high- and 
extreme- poverty tracts beyond the outer belt. 
Austin 
 In 1990, high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods are located throughout the 
central city. The majority of extreme-poverty census tracts are east of Interstate-35. 
Beyond the near urban area, high and extreme poverty neighborhoods are located in the 
southern portion of the metro area near San Marcos and in southeastern Austin MSA near 
Red Rock. Also, Paige to the east and Granger to the northeast are both home to high-
poverty neighborhoods in 1990. 
 Austin’s  high- and extreme-neighborhoods decreased significantly by 2000 and 
noticeable change in the spatial patterns accompanied the decline. The reduction of 
extreme-poverty neighborhoods in near urban areas, particularly east of downtown was 
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the most significant. The outer suburban areas almost disappear aside from the area near 
San Marcos in the south and in Taylor to the northeast. 
 During the 2000s Austin experienced a growth in high- and extreme-poverty 
neighborhoods. High-poverty neighborhoods emerge south of Highway 290 and to the 
southeast along the urban fringe near the Austin-Bergstrom International Airport. Within 
the city, high-poverty neighborhoods run in a linear pattern from the southern to northern 
boundary of Austin, and extreme poverty neighborhoods emerge in the northeast area, 
near the University of Texas – no surprise with the concentration of students. In the 
suburban areas, poverty neighborhoods remain and expand around San Marcos and 
Taylor. 
Denver 
 Extreme-poverty neighborhoods are located along Interstate-25 from north of 
Louisiana Avenue to Interstate-70 in 1990. Many high-poverty neighborhoods are located 
west of I-25 along 6th Avenue, northwest of downtown; and to the north and south of I-
70, east of I-25. High-poverty neighborhoods are also located along Colfax Avenue, east 
of Quebec to I-225. Further, Glendale and the area west of Santa Fe have high poverty 
neighborhoods. 
 Denver experienced a drop in high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods between 
1990 and 2000, but the spatial location did not change a great deal. Overall, there was a 
reduction in extreme-poverty tracts but minor changes in location aside from extreme-
poverty neighborhoods concentrating around I-25 and 6th Avenue. 
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 The number of high- and extreme-poverty tracts jumped from 49 to 140 between 
2000 and 2010 in Denver. This increase in number of tracts resulted in a drastic change in 
geography of poverty. The extreme-poverty neighborhoods continued around 6th Avenue 
and I-25 and transitioned from high-poverty neighborhoods along East Colfax and 
Alameda, west of I-225. High poverty areas expanded from this region to the north of I-
70 and south towards Aurora. Aurora experienced enormous growth in concentrated 
poverty neighborhoods to the west of I-225. 
Seattle 
 The extreme-poverty neighborhoods in 1990 are located predominantly in 
downtown Seattle and around the University of Washington. High-poverty 
neighborhoods extend south from downtown along Interstate-5. Tacoma, Washington – 
in the southern part of the Seattle MSA – also has multiple high- and extreme-poverty 
neighborhoods. Finally, Everett has a small presence of high-poverty neighborhoods. 
 Seattle experienced a reduction in concentrated poverty neighborhoods between 
1990 and 2000. High-poverty neighborhoods replaced extreme-poverty neighborhoods 
near downtown Seattle. Concentrated poverty neighborhoods remained around Everett, in 
the northern part of the metro. The concentration around Tacoma migrated slightly north 
and east. 
 Between 2000 and 2010, the number of high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods 
nearly doubled, from 48 to 94. The growth largely occurred in Tacoma, south of 
downtown Seattle, and near Everett. The growth around Tacoma and Everett were largely 
expansions of previous locations of high-poverty areas, however, the area south of 
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downtown Seattle emerged in 2010, just as downtown experienced a decline. The growth 
occurred at the previous southern boundary of where poverty extended from downtown 
but now extends further south than in 1990. 
Washington, DC 
In 1990, high- and extreme-neighborhoods are located predominantly on the east 
side of Washington, DC. Additionally, there are areas to the northeast around College 
Park, Maryland. Washington, DC had about 20 more high or extreme-poverty tracts in 
2000, and this growth continued to move north and east. The area around College Park, 
MD expands and directly east of the District in Glenarden, MD grows, as well.  
Washington, DC experienced only a small growth in high- or extreme-poverty 
neighborhoods between 2000 and 2010, but the location dispersed slightly from 
downtown Washington, DC and continued to move north of Interstate-695, south of 
Florida Avenue NW, and east. High-and extreme-poverty neighborhoods continue to 
expand around College Park, MD and high-poverty neighborhoods emerge beyond the 
DC boundary along 495, the beltway, in various directions. 
Spatial Statistics 
Global Moran’s  I 
 Global  Moran’s  I  is  a  measure  of  spatial  autocorrelation  – it evaluates the 
clustering of both high and low values. Global  Moran’s  I  is  an  inferential  statistic  and  can  
be evaluated based on the z-score. The null hypothesis of the Global  Moran’s  I  is  that  the 
spatial distribution is random. A statistically insignificant z-score indicates we can not 
reject the null hypothesis, and spatial patterns of the dataset are a random process. A 
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statistically significant z-score indicates either clustering or dispersal beyond random 
processes. If the z-score is statistically significant, we can reject the null hypothesis. The 
direction (positive or negative) of the z-score  and  the  Moran’s  Index  will  correspond.  If 
the z-score is a statistically significant positive value, and the Moran’s  Index  is  positive, 
we reject the null hypothesis because the high and/or low values are more clustered than 
can be expected from a true random process. If the z-score is a statistically significant 
negative value, and the Moran’s  Index is negative, we can also reject the null hypothesis, 
however in this case because the high and low values are more dispersed than would be 
expected from a random selection. The z-score  and  Moran’s  Index  should  be  evaluated  
only in relation to another decade of the same metropolitan area, and not in comparison to 
other metros due to the variation in number of census tracts and spatial units. 
Table  5:  Global  Moran’s  I,  Individuals  in  Poverty 
 
1990 2000 2010 
Buffalo 0.912 0.862 0.559 
  29.15** 27.5** 17.89** 
Cleveland 1.005 0.8552 0.396 
  54.73** 46.59** 21.64** 
Detroit 1.018 0.9262 0.632 
  72.88** 66.33** 45.43** 
Memphis 0.6639 0.397 0.22995 
  16.2297** 9.7** 5.658** 
Denver 0.827 0.72 0.586 
  37.55** 32.69** 26.56** 
Seattle 0.612 0.467 0.3 
  25.62** 19.43** 12.54** 
Washington, DC 1.071 0.88 0.486 
  82.598** 67.8** 37.43** 
Austin 0.647 0.738 0.509 
  16.89** 19.31** 13.37** 
** indicates statistically significant at 99%   
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Table  5  includes  the  Moran’s  Index  and  z-score for each metropolitan area in 
1990,  2000,  and  2010.  The  italicized  number  below  the  Moran’s  Index  is  the  z-score, 
which indicates statistical significance. When measuring the number of individuals in 
poverty in each census tract for 1990, 2000 and 2010, we are able to reject the null 
hypothesis in all eight metropolitan areas because of statistically significant, positive z-
scores, which indicates poverty is spatially autocorrelated.  
Getis-Ord General G 
 The Getis-Ord General G measures if high or low values cluster. The General G 
interprets values in relation to the expected value. The null hypothesis of the General G is 
no spatial clustering. If the General G yields a statistically significant z-score we are able 
to reject the null hypothesis. A statistically significant positive z-score indicates high 
values are more clustered than can be expected from a truly random sample. Statistically 
significant negative z-scores indicate the low-values are spatially clustered more than can 
be expected from a truly random sample. The observed General G ranges from 0-1; the 
closer to 1 indicates high values are clustered, and closer to 0 indicates low values are 
clustered, however, the z-score must be significant in order to reject the null hypothesis. 
 In Table 6, the z-score is the italicized value below Observed General G for each 
metropolitan area in 1990, 2000, and 2010. Testing the number of individuals in number 
of poverty with the Getis-Ord General G, we are able to reject the null hypothesis in each 
metropolitan area because of statistically significant, positive z-scores. 
 
 
 81 
Table 6: Getis-Ord General G, Individuals in Poverty 
 1990 2000 2010 
Buffalo 0.074 0.0628 0.0484 
  18.78** 17.891** 13.303** 
Cleveland 0.0475 0.039 0.026 
  29.563** 25.753** 14.14** 
Detroit 0.0232 0.018 0.0129 
  47.745** 41.42** 28.18** 
Memphis .0288 0.0207 0.016 
  10.559** 7.006** 3.887** 
Denver 0.032 0.027 0.022 
  27.05** 23.44** 18.94** 
Seattle 0.014 0.01196 0.01 
  17.289** 14.365** 10.11** 
Washington, DC 0.025 0.0196 0.0142 
  41.84** 34.33** 21.12** 
Austin 0.029 0.0325 0.023 
  12.92** 14.77** 9.82** 
** indicates statistically significant at 99%   
 
Anselin’s  Local  Moran’s  I 
Anselin’s Local  Moran’s  I  is  the  local  version  of  the  Global  Moran’s  I.  Simply,  it  
measures clustering at the local level and indicates, feature by feature, if a census tract is 
positively or negatively correlated with nearby census tracts. The test determines if there 
is a spatial cluster (of high or low values) or spatial outlier based on the expected 
distribution.  
Buffalo 
 Downtown Buffalo has a clustering of High/High tracts with four Low/High tracts 
interspersed throughout the area. The High/High clusters cover the area from the Niagara 
River to Ogden Street and south of Interstate-90. There are similar clusters observed in 
2000 as in 1990, but the High/High tracts do move slightly to the north. A Low/Low tract 
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emerges to the southeast of Buffalo. In 2010, the High/High clusters continue to move 
north near I-90 and High/High groups are pushed slightly east and west where a minor 
division emerges in north central Buffalo. As is true with previous decades, a small 
number of Low/High tracts are intermixed within the urban area. 
Cleveland 
 High/High clusters are throughout downtown and into eastern neighborhoods of 
the central city, extending to the western boundary of Shaker Heights, an eastern suburb. 
There are also High/High tracts near Lorain in the western part of the metropolitan area. 
Lastly, the southwest portion of the metropolitan area has multiple Low/Low tracts. In 
2000,  there  isn’t  much  change  in  the  clusters  of  High/High tracts downtown or in Lorain. 
Also, the Low/Low tracts continue in Beachwood and expand north on the west side 
towards Avon. 
 Lastly, in 2010, High/High clusters remain in Lorain and emerge in the far eastern 
part near Painesville and Grand River. Downtown, the High/High tracts split down the 
center and move west, southeast and northeast. Low/Low tracts retreat to the 
southwestern corner of the metro in a similar pattern as 1990.  
Detroit 
 There is a considerable concentration of High/High tracts in the Detroit urban 
area, primarily south of 8-Mile Road and east of Highway 24 and Dearborn. There are 
some scattered Low/High tracts in downtown – however, these are primarily low 
population tracts with less than 200 people. Further there is an isolated High/High tract 
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west of the city and multiple in the Pontiac region. Finally, Low/Low neighborhoods are 
found throughout the western and northern metro area. 
 The concentration of High/High neighborhoods in central Detroit continue but 
there is a slight reduction in the number of tracts classified as High/High, particularly in 
the northwest part of Detroit near the intersection of 8 Mile and Highway 24. The isolated 
group of High/High tracts west of the city remains and the cluster near Pontiac slightly 
expands. The number of Low/Low tracts increases in the north and western part of the 
metro area. These areas could potentially have a strong link to Ann Arbor, Michigan – 
just outside the Detroit metro area. 
 In 2010, the High/High clusters in downtown deconcentrated slightly and move 
toward the north and the west. Further, the High/High tracks near Pontiac and the area 
west of the city continue to expand from their coverage in 2000. 
Memphis 
 High/High tracts cover much of downtown and predominantly are located in the 
western part of downtown Memphis and extend north and south. The western most 
boundary of the metropolitan area is also home to High/High clusters. East of Memphis 
there is clusters of Low/Low tracts near Collierville, Macon and Brunswick. There is also 
a High/Low tract near Mt. Pleasant. In 2000, the Low/Low to the east expands north 
towards Brighton and south towards West Olive Branch and the High/Low near Mt. 
Pleasant remains. The High/High clusters near downtown remain in similar locations 
with some growth to the south. 
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 Lastly, the High/High clusters in 2010 are similar to the pattern in 2000 but there 
is a slight reduction in downtown as High/High clusters expand to the southwest and 
north. The Low/Low tracts remain east of the city and Low/High tracts emerge northwest 
of Memphis in Arkansas. 
Austin 
 Clusters of High/High neighborhoods are noticeable in the southern and eastern 
part  of  Austin’s  metropolitan  area,  near  San  Marcos  and  Cedar  Creek,  respectively.  
High/High clusters are also near downtown Austin, primarily north of Highway 290, 
extending north along Interstate along and to the east of Interstate-35. There are two 
neighborhoods of Low/High near the University of Texas and surrounded by High/High 
neighborhoods. There are also Low/High tracts around Lamar Boulevard, north of E 38th 
and south of East 51st. There are Low/Low clusters north of the city around Florence, 
Lake Georgetown and Hutto; as well as to the northwest near Jonestown, Pointe Venture, 
Laga Vista and Volente. High/Low clusters are along the western and northern fringe of 
the metro area. 
 The clusters of High/High tracts in the central city move east and south. No 
clusters remain in the northeastern portion of Austin, near Chestnut and Martin Luther 
King. Clusters of High/High also continue in San Marcos area. Low/Low neighborhoods 
are again located north of the city near Liberty Hill, Georgetown municipal Airport and 
Hutto. 
 In 2010, High/High neighborhoods move north of 290 and east of Highway 130. 
Growth continues to the south of the city. Clustering continues to disappear near the area 
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around Martin Luther King, Manor Road and Springdale Road that began to experience 
no clustering in 2000. High/High neighborhoods continue and grow in the southern and 
easternmost regions of the metropolitan area. Additionally, the Low/Low neighborhoods 
perpetuate around Liberty Hill, Georgetown and Hutto. 
Denver 
 From 1990 to 2010, Low/Low clusters are throughout the southern metro area. In 
1990, High/High clusters are located throughout Denver, particularly west of Santa Fe; 
west of I-25 along 6th Avenue; along Interstate-70 east of Interstate-25; and East Colfax. 
In 2000, there is little change in the High/High clusters, but there is some growth on the 
east side, to the north of Interstate-70 near the I-225/I-70 intersection. Three Low/High 
tracts emerge west of Sheridan Avenue, east of I-25 and West of Broadway, south of 
Colfax. Finally, in 2010, High/High clusters disperse a bit from city center. There is 
significant growth in Aurora, along the I-225 corridor, as well as growth to the north near 
Westminster. 
Seattle 
 Many neighborhoods of High/High clusters are found in the Seattle metro area in 
1990. High/High clusters are throughout downtown Seattle and extend south along and to 
the west of Interstate-5. Clusters of High/High tracts are also prevalent in Tacoma. 
Everett, Washington – in the northern metro area – has a mix of High/High and 
Low/High tracts. Finally, the eastern part of the metro is home to multiple Low/Low 
tracts from directly east of Seattle and extending north.  
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In 2000, High/High tracts continue near downtown Seattle; clusters reduce to the 
area west of Interstate-5, south of Seattle. Near Tacoma, the High/High clusters move 
east and Low/High tracts emerge to the west and northeast of Tacoma. Everett continues 
to be an even mix and the concentration of Low/Low neighborhoods remains but moves 
slightly east. 
In 2010 the north and eastern area of the metro experience few changes. The 
concentration of High/High tracts diminishes around downtown and High/High clusters 
emerge south of downtown Seattle, as well Low/High tracts interspersed in this area. The 
area around the University of Washington has a mix of High/High and Low/High 
neighborhoods. 
Washington, DC 
 In 1990, High/High clusters dominate eastern half of Washington, DC as well as 
College Park, MD and Glenarden, MD. Additionally, there are Low/High clusters 
northwest of downtown along Massachusetts Avenue, near Georgetown University (I 
think). Patterns are similar in 2000 as in 1990, but High/High clusters expand east. 
Further, High/High clusters emerge outside of DC south of Arlington and west of 
Alexandria. The areas extending southeast of the US Capital along Pennsylvania Avenue 
that were not significant in 1990 emerge as Low/High cluster in 2000. Lastly, in 2010 
there is a growth of High/High clusters to the northeast, outside of Washington, DC 
towards Silver Spring, MD – along the northeast border south of College Park, MD. By 
2010, there is a complete absence of High/High tracts in the western half of Washington, 
DC and scattered Low/High tracts invade the eastern and northern parts of DC. 
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Getis Gi* 
Getis Gi* is the local test of Getis-Ord General G. The Gi* indicates hot-spots, or 
areas where there is spatial clustering of high values. The test also indicates cold-spots, 
which are areas were there is spatial clustering of low values. To be clear, cold-spots due 
not signal affluent areas, cold-spots only indicate  clustering of tracts with low-numbers 
of individuals in poverty.  
Buffalo 
 There is little change in the location of hot-spots in Buffalo from 1990 to 2000. In 
1990, hot-spots are located throughout downtown Buffalo. In 2000, those hot-spots have 
extended slightly north and in addition, a hot-spot emerges near Niagara Falls in the 
northern part of the Buffalo MSA. In 2010 the hot-spots near Buffalo move both north 
and south along the Niagara River while the tracts in north central Buffalo disappear. 
Further, isolated cold-spots emerge to the east of Buffalo. 
Cleveland 
 In 1990, hot-spots are found in Lorain and encompasses the majority of 
downtown – extending west, northeast and southeast. Cold-spots surround the western 
boundary near Rocky River and Brook Park; in the southwest near Parma Heights and in 
the east around Beachwood, South University Heights and Cleveland Heights. In 2000, 
the cold-spots around Rocky River disperse in the southwest a bit. As for the hot-spots, 
there is almost zero change between 1990 and 2000. Finally, in 2010 hot-spots emerge 
near Painesville and expand around Lorain. Further, the hot-spot in downtown splits and 
there is growth to the west and southwest as well as the northeast. The intensity around 
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90/71/77 (Newburgh Heights?) diminishes and the cold-spots remain similar as in 2000 – 
only Westlake emerges as a cold-spot.  
Detroit 
 Unlike  many  other  metros,  Detroit’s  cold  spots  are  as  notable  as  their  hot-spots. 
There are four areas surrounding Detroit with cold-spots in 1990. Broadly, these areas are 
Livonia, Sterling Heights and Warren; more specifically: Redford to the west; West 
Bloomfield to the northwest; Beverly Hills and Huntington Woods to the north; and 
Warren, St. Clair Shores, and Grosse Point to the northeast. Hot-spots are found in 
downtown Detroit – south of 8 Mile Road and east of Dearborn. Pontiac, to the northwest 
of Detroit, also has a clustering of high poverty tracts. 
 The cold-spots remain and expand in 2000. Further, a new area – Southgate to the 
south of the city – emerges. There is also growth to the west of Redford and Beverly Hills 
expands north towards Bloomfield Hills. Hot-spots continue to cover the majority of 
downtown and grow north and west towards 8 Mile Road and Highway 24.  Finally, in 
2010, the cold-spots continue to expand and intensify because the confidence level 
increases. West Bloomfield, Plymoth and Redford nearly merge as the cold-spots move 
south of West Bloomfield. Bloomfield Hills continues to intensify and there is an 
emergence of cold-spots in Rochester Hills. The area between Warren and St. Clair 
widens as the cold-spots retreat towards each community. Finally, the hot-spots move 
slightly north and northwest as the central city intensity diminishes. 
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Memphis 
 There are cold-spots near Germantown, TN, southeast of Memphis in 1990. The 
hot-spots are found along the western side of Interstate-240 in downtown Memphis and 
extends north and south throughout the city limits plus north of I-240. Further, hot-spots 
are located on the western periphery. 
Austin 
 Hot-spots emerge in downtown Austin and various suburban locations. There are 
hot-spots in the southern portion of the metropolitan area near San Marcos and in 
scattered areas to the east and northeast part of the metro area. Similar patterns are 
present in 2000. Within the downtown area, the intensity is reduced but clusters remain in 
the in similar locations. In 2010, clusters occur in fewer neighborhoods to the south, but 
higher intensity within the tracts that do. There is a noticeable change in the clustering of 
individuals in poverty near downtown Austin. Clustering moves north near Pflugerville, 
east towards Walter E. Long Lake. The most noticeable change is the disappearance of 
clustering east of Interstate-35, north of 7th Street and south of E 51st Street.  
Denver 
 In 1990, there are hot-spots, signaling a high number of individuals in poverty, 
along Santa Fe from the southwest into downtown Denver. There are also hot-spots along 
east Colfax; and northeast of Denver near Commerce City. Three areas experience cold-
spots: east of I-225 in Aurora, Highlands Ranch in the south as well as an area near 
Englewood. 
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 There is very little change between 1990 and 2000 for cold-spots or hot-spots in 
Denver. Cold-spots continue in the same areas in 2000 as in 1990 with the emergence of 
a small area west of Arvada. As for hot-spots, the east side expands north of Colfax. 
Finally, in 2010, the growth of high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods resulted in 
increased hot-spots and cold-spots. Cold-spots expand from the areas in 1990 in 2000 and 
the confidence levels increase, especially in Highlands Ranch. To the north and west, the 
minor cold-spot from 2000 around Arvada expands in 2010 and cold-spots emerge in 
Broomfield and Henderson. Hot-spots move north of Denver towards Westminster and 
expand along I-225 corridor in Aurora. Lastly, the consistent hot-spot in the center of 
downtown splits and a gap emerges between the hotspots along I-25 and I-225 from 
Lincoln to Quebec, south of Colfax and towards City Park. 
Seattle 
 In 1990 there are three distinct hot-spots in the Seattle metropolitan area. The hot-
spots are located around downtown Seattle, Tacoma and Everett. Also during this time, 
there is cold-spot around Mill Creek. In 2000, the same general patterns are present, yet 
the hot-spots near downtown Seattle move to the north and diminish slightly west of I-5 
near the coast. The intensity, or confidence intervals of the tracts, increases around 
Tacoma and expands to the south. Cold-spots emerge east of the city extending both 
north and south. In 2010, the hot-spots near Tacoma contract. The hot-spots in downtown 
Seattle diminish and move south as the previously southern boundary becomes a northern 
boundary. Small clusters remain north of downtown and near the University of 
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Washington. Hot-spots continue around Everett. Cold-spots expand and/or merge along 
the eastern boundary of Seattle. 
Washington, DC 
 In 1990, there are cold spots west of Washington, DC near Washington Dulles 
Airport, north in Ashburn, east of Herndon and to the south near Centerville. Hot-spots 
dominate the eastern half plus much of the area near downtown, north of the Potomac 
River. Hot-spots extend toward Silver Spring, College Park and Glendarden, Maryland 
with a small cluster in southwest Arlington. 
 In 2000, the hot-spot in southwest Arlington expands greatly. The concentration 
to the east remains and intensifies beyond DC boundary. Scattered cold-spots continue 
around Washington Dulles Airport and emerge northwest of DC in Chevy Chase. 
 In 2010, the cold-spots expand from Chevy Chase and West of Alexandria. 
Arlington experiences growth of cold spots and the area around Dulles expands. Hot-spot 
continues to cover eastern half of District but areas emerge far north near Aspen Hill, 
south of Gaithersburg, MD and to the far west near Manassas Park, VA. 
 The following section describes the results of each segregation measure regarding 
the segregation of affluence. The section is organized in the same order as the segregation 
of poverty. 
Segregation of Affluence 
Affluence Rate 
 The affluence rate reflects the percentage of household in the top income category 
for each decennial census. In 1990, the top income bracket was household income greater 
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than $150,000 and in 2000 and 2010, the threshold was $200,000 and above. Using this 
threshold as a barometer for affluence means the affluent population constitutes a smaller 
portion of the metropolitan populace than the poor residents. Results are in Figure 6. 
Figure 9: Affluence Rates, 1990-2010 
 
 
The story of affluence rates is the story of Washington, DC. In 1990, Washington, 
DC had an affluence rate of 3.17% and Buffalo had the lowest that decade at 0.9%. There 
was no clear pattern between the strong and weak metro areas. The average affluence rate 
in the strong metro areas was 1.97% and the weak average was 1.35%. 
In 2000, the affluence rate for all eight metropolitan areas increased, but 
Washington, DC (4.76%) and Buffalo (1.27%) remained the benchmarks. The average 
affluence rate for the strong metropolitan areas increased to 3.18%. The gap between the 
two groups widened slightly as the weaker metros average affluence rate in 2000 was 
2.09%. 
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For the third consecutive decade, Washington, DC had the highest affluence rate – 
skyrocketing to 11.6% – and Buffalo had the lowest, 2.5%. The affluence rate increased 
in all eight metros for the second decade in a row, but the stronger metros increased at a 
much faster rate. In addition to Washington,  DC’s  explosion  to  11.6%, Austin, Seattle 
and Denver all more than doubled the total number of affluent households in this period. 
The strong metros each had affluence rates above 5.13% and none of the weaker metros 
eclipsed 3.6%. The average affluence rate in stronger metros was 6.9%, more than twice 
that of the weaker metros average, 3.13%.   
To illustrate the difference of growth in affluent households between the two 
groups, examine the effects of the higher affluence rate combined with the population 
growth between 1990 and 2010. In 1990, when the population and affluence rate were 
similar, the difference of affluent households was only 60,000. Between 1990 and 2010 
in the stronger metropolitan areas, the total number of affluent households increased by 
almost 700,000. Affluent households in the weaker metropolitan areas increased by just 
under 160,000. As a result, the stronger metropolitan areas had roughly 600,000 more 
affluent households than the weaker metropolitan areas in 2010. 
Dissimilarity Index 
 As discussed in the segregation of poverty, the affluence rate of the metro does 
influence how we interpret the dissimilarity values. On average, the affluence rates were 
much lower than the poverty rates; the highest observed affluence rate was 11.6% and the 
remaining 23 values were all below 5.7%. Thus, values  that  indicate  ‘evenness’  between  
affluent – non-affluent households must be lower than when discussing low-income 
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groups. In a scenario where the affluence rate is 6% and the non-affluence rate 94%, a 
dissimilarity  value  of  .06  indicates  ‘evenness’.   
Figure 10: Dissimilarity Index, Affluence 
 
 
 However, low values are not what we find. In fact, they exceed dissimilarity 
values observed in the segregation of poverty despite affluence rates being less than half 
the poverty rates. In 1990, Cleveland had the highest dissimilarity value, .64 and Seattle 
had the lowest at .48. The weaker metropolitan areas all had values higher than .61 and as 
a group, averaged .625. The stronger metro areas values were below .62, but averaged 
.545 as a group.  
 The dissimilarity values decreased for all eight metropolitan areas in the 1990s. 
This diminished the gap between the highest and lowest metro areas and between the two 
groups. Denver, Detroit and Cleveland had the highest value, .52 and Seattle again had 
the lowest of .45. The stronger metropolitan areas average value was .49 and the weaker 
metro areas average was .515. Six of the eight metros had values of either .51 or .52; only 
Seattle and Washington, DC had values below that threshold. 
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 In 2010, the gap between the strong and weak metropolitan areas increased. 
Memphis had the highest dissimilarity value of .58. Seattle and DC again had the lowest 
two values, each .43. Between 2000 and 2010, the weak metropolitan areas increased or 
did not change. On the other hand, the stronger metro areas decreased or stabilized, aside 
from Austin, which increased from .51 to .52. The weaker metros all had values greater 
than .51 for the second consecutive decade, with an average value of .55. The strong 
metros had values below .52, and an average of .47. 
Given the significantly higher affluence rate of the stronger metros in 2010, this 
relationship between strong and weak metros, and the degree of the relationship, is quite 
surprising. Further, these trends occurred as the strong metropolitan areas experienced a 
noteworthy increase in their affluence rates. What this relationship potentially suggests is 
that the growing number of affluent households in the strong metro areas makes it easier 
for high-income households to disperse throughout the metro area and still live in 
relatively high-income neighborhoods. Additionally, in stagnant cities, neighborhoods 
may be more strongly defined by socioeconomic status, culture or heritage. Without an 
influx of new people, roles within the community are less likely to undergo change. 
Future indices and other tests will provide an indication if these assumptions have merit. 
Beyond the potential scenarios contributing to the division between the two groups, the 
most notable result is the ability of affluent populations to segregate, despite constituting 
such a small percentage of the population. 
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Exposure Indices 
 The isolation index is a measure of how isolated the minority group (in this case, 
high-income household) is from the majority. The isolation index value indicates the 
likelihood an affluent household will live in the same neighborhood as other affluent 
households. An index value of 1 indicates that all affluent households live in 
neighborhoods of only affluent households. 
Figure 11: Isolation Index, Affluence 
 
 
 In 1990, Washington, DC and Detroit had the highest isolation value, .13. Seattle 
and Buffalo had the lowest index, .06. There is no separation between the two groups of 
metros, each range from .06 to .13 and the strong metros average isolation index value 
was .09 and the weak metros were .1. 
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remained the lowest at .06. All four strong metropolitan areas increased between 1990 
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and 2000, causing their average to increase from .09 to .11. The weaker metros average 
decreased from .1 to .09.  
 Washington, DC and Buffalo continued to have the highest and lowest isolation 
values  in  2010.  Buffalo’s  value  increased  from  .06  to  .08  and  Washington,  DC’s  isolation  
value jumped from .14 to .23, accompanying the rapid increase observed in the nation’s  
capital affluence rate. All eight metropolitan areas increased between 2000 and 2010. The 
average for the strong metropolitan areas increased to .17 and the weaker metros climbed 
to .12. Between 1990 and 2010, the stronger metros average nearly doubled, from .09 to 
.17 while the weaker metropolitan areas increased modestly from .1 to .12. Despite lower 
levels of unevenness, affluent households in the stronger metros are twice as isolated, on 
average, as in the weaker metros. 
Spatial Segregation Indices 
While the dissimilarity index and isolation index are aspatial, three of the 
segregation dimensions are spatial: concentration, clustering and centralization. To my 
knowledge, these three indices have not been used to measure the segregation of 
affluence; therefore, the value of this approach is unknown due to the lack of comparable 
research. Results from the Absolute Concentration Index (ACO) are presented in Figure 
12.The ACO ranges from 0 to 1 and the higher value corresponds with higher 
segregation. 
All eight metropolitan areas exhibited particularly high levels of concentration of 
affluence, which I find interesting due to affluence usually occurring on the periphery in 
larger census tracts with less population density. The ACO values range from .87 to .98 
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in 1990. Denver and Seattle have the highest degree of concentration at .98, and 
Cleveland the lowest at .87. There is not a clear division between the two groups, but the 
stronger metropolitan areas have a higher average, .96 compared to .92. 
Figure 12: Absolute Concentration Index, Affluence 
 
All eight metros exhibited a decline during the 1990s. Denver and Memphis had 
the highest ACO values, .86, and Cleveland remained the lowest, declining to .84 in 
2000.  The strong metros averaged .94, and the weaker metros averaged .90. 
For the second straight decade, all eight metros experienced a decline in ACO 
values. Denver and Memphis remained as the metros with the highest values, .95, and for 
the third straight decade, Cleveland experienced the lowest concentration of affluence, 
with a value of .82. The weak metros average dropped to .88 and the strong metros to .91. 
This consistent decline over the 20-year study period occurred as affluence rates and 
isolation increased in these metropolitan areas. 
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The Absolute Clustering Index (ACI) measures the degree to which poverty 
neighborhoods adjoin one another. The ACI ranges from 0 to 1; the closer a value is to 1 
indicates higher segregation. The results are presented in Figure 13. 
Detroit and Washington, DC experienced the highest levels of clustering, .08, in 
1990. The values are low, likely due to the small affluence rate in 1990 – there were not 
enough affluent neighborhoods to cluster. Buffalo and Seattle had the lowest values, .02. 
The weaker metropolitan areas averaged .05 and the strong metros .04. 
Clustering increased in all metros, aside from Cleveland, during the 1990s. 
Washington, DC (.09) and Buffalo (.03) remained the highest and lowest metropolitan 
areas. The strong metropolitan areas average increased to .06 and the weak metros 
remained at .05.  
Figure 13: Absolute Clustering Index, Affluence 
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Clustering increased in all eight metros during the 2000s. For the third 
consecutive decade, Washington, DC and Buffalo exhibited the highest and lowest levels 
of clustering. The averages of each group increased by .02 during this decade; the strong 
metros to .08, and the weak metros to .07. 
The Absolute Centralization Index (ACI), which measures the proximity of 
individuals in poverty to the central city. The ACI ranges from -1 to 1; a positive value 
indicates a high degree of centralization, a negative value indicates affluent households 
are far from the central city, and a 0 indicates there is even dispersion throughout the 
metropolitan area.  
Figure 14: Absolute Centralization Index, Affluence 
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Memphis, the strong metropolitan areas had the four highest values. The strong 
metropolitan areas averaged .82 while the weaker metros averaged .68.  
Between 1990 and 2000, all eight metropolitan areas declined or remained the 
same. Seattle joined Denver as the metro area with the highest ACE, .84, and Cleveland 
remained the lowest at .57. Consequently, the averages for each group declined. The 
strong and weak metros averaged .80 and .65, respectively. 
The Absolute Centralization Index declined in all eight metros for the second 
consecutive decade. Denver and Seattle remained the highest at .83, and Cleveland had 
the lowest ACE for the third consecutive decade. The strong metros average declined to 
.78 while the weak metros average dropped to .61. It is important to note Denver 
consistently high values in all three decade for both the segregation of poverty and 
affluence, raising the possibility that the results are a product of the index as much as 
they are a result of the data. 
High- and Extreme-Affluence Neighborhoods 
I mapped the concentration of affluence at two different thresholds, 20-39% 
(high-affluence) and greater than 40% (extreme-affluence). Affluence rates are lower 
than poverty rates therefore I anticipate fewer numbers of high- and extreme-affluence 
neighborhoods, yet any neighborhood that does reach these thresholds illustrates 
concentrations of an incredibly small minority.  
I present the results of extreme-affluence neighborhoods using total numbers due 
to the small number of tracts that qualify. To discuss high-affluence neighborhoods, I use 
percentages and total numbers. The percentages correct for the wide range of census 
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tracts within each metropolitan area and raw numbers are important due to the small 
numbers of high-affluence tracts in many metro areas. 
Extreme-affluence neighborhoods 
 Washington, DC had the highest number of extreme-affluence census tracts all 
three decades and until 2010, the only metro area to have a noteworthy percentage. In 
1990, eight, or 0.59% of the census tracts in Washington, DC were extreme-affluence 
neighborhoods. In that same decade, Austin, Seattle, Memphis and Buffalo all had zero 
neighborhoods. 
Table 7: Extreme-Affluence Census Tracts 
  1990 2000 2010 total 
CT 
Buffalo 0 0 0 297 
Cleveland 1 0 2 635 
Detroit 1 2 2 1297 
Memphis 0 0 0 312 
Austin 0 1 3 350 
Denver 2 2 6 621 
Seattle 0 0 3 719 
Washington 
DC 
8 8 67 1347 
 
 In 2000, Washington, DC had eight extreme-affluence neighborhoods for the 
second consecutive decade. Cleveland lost its one neighborhood of extreme-affluence, 
joining Buffalo, Memphis and Seattle with zero extreme-affluence neighborhoods. Austin 
gained 1. 
 There  was  noticeable  change  in  2010  data.  Washington,  DC’s  number  of  extreme-
affluence  neighborhoods  exploded  from  8  to  67,  constituting  4.97%  of  the  district’s  
census tracts. Buffalo and Memphis had zero for the third straight decade. All growth 
pales in comparison to DC, but, the other three strong metropolitan areas experienced 
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growth in the number of extreme-affluence neighborhoods. Denver increased from 2 to 6, 
Austin from 1 to 3 and Seattle from 0 to 3. The weaker metros combined to have four, 
two in Cleveland and Detroit, respectively. The strong metropolitan areas average 
percentage of extreme-affluence neighborhoods was 1.8%, while the weaker metropolitan 
areas was only 0.12%.  The margins are small when excluding DC, but the increase in 
concentration of affluent households occurs mostly in the strong metropolitan areas. 
High-affluence neighborhoods 
 Washington, DC leads the way in high-affluence census tracts, as well. In 1990, 
DC had 26 – 1.93% – neighborhoods with affluence rates between 20 and 39%. Detroit 
had the second most, 19 neighborhoods, 1.47%. On the low end, Memphis had zero high-
affluence neighborhoods, Buffalo had one, and Austin and Seattle each had 2.  
Table 8: High-Affluence Census Tracts 
  1990 2000 2010 total 
CT 
Buffalo 1 1 1 297 
Cleveland 5 7 11 635 
Detroit 19 31 46 1297 
Memphis 0 2 9 312 
Austin 2 7 18 350 
Denver 3 17 34 621 
Seattle 2 14 29 719 
Washington 
DC 
26 57 194 1347 
 
Washington, DC had 57 high-affluence neighborhoods, 4.23% of  the  metro’s  
tracts, in 2000. Buffalo had 1 high-affluence neighborhood and Memphis had 2. As a 
result of the small number in 1990, seven metropolitan areas increased their number of 
high-affluence neighborhoods; Buffalo had one again. The strong metropolitan areas 
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higher affluence neighborhoods constituted, on average, 2.73% of the metros tracts and 
the weaker metros averaged 1.12%. 
Figure 15: High-Affluence Neighborhoods, as a Percent of Total Census Tracts 
  
 Finally, Washington experienced a rapid growth in high-affluence neighborhoods 
in 2010, just as in extreme-affluence neighborhoods. In 2010, DC had 194 high-affluence 
neighborhoods, 14.4% of the metro area’s census tracts. Buffalo remained on the low end 
with only one high-affluence neighborhood for the third consecutive decade. Mimicking 
the trend of extreme-affluence, the disparity between the strong and weak metropolitan 
areas grew in 2010. The strong metropolitan areas all had more than 4% of their census 
tracts classified as high-affluence, while no weak metro area had a percentage higher than 
3.55%. The stronger metropolitan areas averaged 7.26% and 2.72% for the weaker 
metros. Aside from Buffalo, the seven metros each noticed an increase in the 
concentration of affluent households, but the magnitude of the growth which took place 
between the two groups is wide. 
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High- and Extreme-Affluence Neighborhoods 
 Overall, in 1990 and 2000, there was only minor separation between the two 
groups in the concentration of affluence, at the high- and extreme- threshold. Denver and 
Seattle noticed a small increase in high-affluence neighborhoods in 2000, but the 
disparity that did exist between the two groups at any other point could be attributed 
largely to Washington, DC.  However, a clear division emerges in 2010 when considering 
the number of high- and extreme-affluence neighborhoods. Only 2.84% of the census 
tracts in the weaker metropolitan areas had concentration levels of affluence higher than 
20%. On the other hand, 9.06% of the strong metropolitan  areas’  census  tracts  were  
classified as high- or extreme-affluence. The growth of affluent household between 1990 
and 2010 in the strong metropolitan areas contributed to higher rates of affluence 
metropolitan wide and the clustering of those populations. 
Spatial Patterns of Concentrated affluence 
The spatial patterns of concentrated affluence are less notable because of the 
small number of high- and extreme-affluence neighborhoods. Below is a summary of the 
patterns observed. 
Buffalo 
Buffalo has only one – the same one – high-affluence tract each decade. The tract 
is located northeast of Buffalo near the area of East Amherst. The percentage of affluent 
households in the tract each decade is 20.6% in 1990, 21.7% in 2000 and 25.4% in 2010. 
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Cleveland 
 Concentrated affluence is located near the eastern suburbs – Shaker Heights, 
Gates Mills and Chagrin Falls – of Cleveland in 1990. These core areas remain the 
location of concentrated affluence neighborhoods in 2000 and 2010 and the seven new 
neighborhoods that emerge over the two-decade span are located in these areas.  
Detroit 
 Detroit had the second highest number, 20, of neighborhoods exceeding 20% 
affluence in 1990 and they were located to the northwest of Detroit near Bloomfield. The 
location did not change significantly in 2000 or 2010; the total number of tracts more 
than doubled over the 20-year period and grew from Bloomfield to the north and 
southwest. 
Memphis 
 Memphis had zero neighborhoods of concentrated affluence in 1990. The two 
tracts that appear in 2000 are southeast of Memphis near Germantown. In 2010, the 
number expands to nine and a linear group of tracts forms along Poplar Avenue 
(Highway 72) from eastern Memphis to Germantown. 
Austin 
 Austin’s  two  concentrated affluence neighborhoods are west of downtown near 
Rollingwood and West Lake Hills in 1990. As the number grows to 8 in 2000, one of the 
neighborhoods from 1990 becomes extreme and surrounding neighborhoods emerge as 
high-affluence tracts. Affluent neighborhoods increase from 8 to 21 and the growth 
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continues west of Austin. As the number of neighborhoods more than doubles, the 
growth spreads from the original 1990 neighborhoods in all cardinal directions. 
Denver 
 Denver’s  high- and extreme-affluence neighborhoods are located in Cherry Hills 
Village in 1990. As the number of tracts increases nearly four-fold by 2000, the area 
expands, but they persist largely to the south of Denver and 470. Of note, three tracts near 
Washington Park and Capital Hill, southeast of downtown, emerge as high-affluence 
neighborhoods. The number of neighborhoods increased from 19 to 40 by 2010 and 
growth continues to take place south of Denver along the periphery and an additional 
tract emerges near Washington Park. 
Seattle 
 The only concentrated affluence tracts in 1990 are east of Seattle on Lake 
Washington near Clyde Hill and in 2000, additional tracts emerge in a similar area. In 
2010, Seattle’s  increase  of concentrated affluence neighborhoods, from 14 to 32, grows 
to the east of downtown. The original two high-affluence tracts in 1990 are extreme-
affluence by 2010.  
Washington, DC 
 In 1990, the other seven metropolitan areas have a total of 34 concentrated 
affluence neighborhoods, Washington DC has 34. The majority these tracts are located 
northwest of DC near Potomac, MD and extend towards the western boundary. There is a 
similar pattern in 2000, but a noticeable increase in the total number of tracts that spread 
in all directions from the 1990 concentrated affluence neighborhoods. In 2010, there is 
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noticeable growth, to 261 tracts, throughout the metro area.  Potomac,  Tyson’s  Corner  and  
McLean are filled with extreme-affluence neighborhoods. Neighborhoods emerge 
southwest of DC in Fairfax, VA and near Brookeville, MD. 
Spatial Statistics 
Global Moran’s  I 
Global  Moran’s  I  is  a  measure  of  spatial  autocorrelation  – it evaluates the 
clustering of both high and low values. Global  Moran’s  I  is  an  inferential  statistic  and  can  
be evaluated based on the z-score. The null hypothesis of the Global  Moran’s  I  is that the 
spatial distribution is random. A statistically insignificant z-score indicates we can not 
reject the null hypothesis, and spatial patterns of the dataset are a random process. A 
statistically significant z-score indicates either clustering or dispersal beyond random 
processes. If the z-score is statistically significant, we can reject the null hypothesis. The 
direction (positive or negative) of the z-score  and  the  Moran’s  Index  will  correspond.  If 
the z-score is a statistically significant positive  value,  and  the  Moran’s  Index  is  positive, 
we reject the null hypothesis because the high and/or low values are more clustered than 
can be expected from a true random process. If the z-score is a statistically significant 
negative  value,  and  the  Moran’s  Index is negative, we can also reject the null hypothesis, 
however in this case because the high and low values are more dispersed than would be 
expected from a random selection. The z-score  and  Moran’s  Index  should  be  evaluated  
only in relation to another decade of the same metropolitan area, and not in comparison to 
other metros due to the variation in number of census tracts and spatial units. 
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Table  9  includes  the  Moran’s  Index  and  z-score for each metropolitan area in 
1990, 2000, and 2010. The italicized  number  below  the  Moran’s  Index  is  the  z-score for 
the dataset. To test the spatial autocorrelation of affluence, I used the total number of 
households in the top income bracket for each decade.  
Table  9:  Global  Moran’s  I,  Affluent  Households 
 
1990 2000 2010 
Austin 0.38 0.29 0.02 
  10.15** 7.619** 5.47** 
Denver 0.26 0.25 0.31 
  12.27** 11.38** 14.1** 
Seattle 0.27 0.32 0.34 
  11.41** 13.3** 14.04** 
Washington DC 0.33 0.36 0.37 
  26.00** 27.97** 28.38** 
Buffalo 0.10 0.07 0.16 
  3.72** 2.52* 5.299** 
Cleveland 0.19 0.18 0.21 
  11.00** 10.12** 11.3** 
Detroit 0.28 0.30 0.32 
  20.79** 21.81** 23.17** 
Memphis 0.30 0.03 0.17 
  7.7** 6.64** 4.38** 
** indicates statistically significant at the 99% 
* indicates statistically significant at the 95% 
 
Buffalo, NY had a statistically significant positive z-score – indicating the high 
and/or low values are clustered in 1990 and 2010. In 2000 Buffalo had a positive z-score 
but significant only at the 95% interval. The remaining seven metropolitan areas 
experienced a positive z-score indicating spatial clustering above the 99% confidence 
interval,  therefore  I  believe  Buffalo’s  lower  value  in  2000  is  noteworthy.  Due  to  the  
particularly high z-scores of spatial autocorrelation for both poverty and affluence, the 
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global  Moran’s  I  make  it  challenging  to  determine  if  high  and/or  low  values  are  
contributing to the spatial autocorrelation. 
Getis-Ord General G 
The Getis-Ord General G measures if high or low values cluster. The General G 
interprets values in relation to the expected value. The null hypothesis of the General G is 
no spatial clustering. If the General G yields a statistically significant z-score we are able 
to reject the null hypothesis. A statistically significant positive z-score indicates high 
values are more clustered than can be expected from a truly random sample. Statistically 
significant negative z-scores indicate the low-values are spatially clustered more than can 
be expected from a truly random sample. The observed General G ranges from 0-1; the 
closer to 1 indicates high values are clustered, and closer to 0 indicates low values are 
clustered, however, the z-score must be significant in order to reject the null hypothesis. 
In Table 10, the z-score is the italicized value below Observed General G for each 
metropolitan area in 1990, 2000, and 2010. The Getis-Ord General G measuring 
affluence presents the most interesting results of either global spatial statistic measuring 
poverty  or  affluence.  Buffalo’s  hot-spot analysis produced non-statistically significant z-
scores all three decades therefore I fail to reject the null hypothesis, which means the 
distribution of affluent households is one of the possible spatially random scenarios. 
High-values clustered in Denver and Detroit in 1990 and 2000 but were randomly 
distributed in 2010. Austin and Memphis each experienced high-value clusters in 1990 
but random distribution in 2000 and 2010. High values clustered in Seattle and 
Washington, DC all three decades studied. Finally, Cleveland presents arguably the most 
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interesting pattern. High values clustered in 1990, the distribution of affluent households 
in 2000 was random and in 2010, Cleveland exhibited clustering of low-values by 
producing a statistically significant negative value. 
Table 10: Getis-Ord General G, Affluent Households 
Column1 1990 2000 2010 
Austin 0.04 0.01 0.01 
  6.33** 1.67 -0.40 
Denver 0.02 0.02 0.01 
  8.82** 4.43** 2.35* 
Seattle 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  5.09** 5.06** 4.77** 
Washington DC 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  10.14** 8.08** 2.78* 
Buffalo 0.03 0.02 0.02 
  0.65 -0.45 -1.18 
Cleveland 0.02 0.01 0.01 
  2.86** -1.12 -2.2** 
Detroit 0.01 0.00 0.01 
  8.33** 2.67** 1.60 
Memphis 0.03 0.02 0.01 
  4.69** 2.55* 0.57 
** indicates statistically significant at the 99% 
* indicates statistically significant at the 95% 
 
Anselin’s  Local  Moran’s  I 
Anselin’s  Local  Moran’s  I  is  the  local  version  of  the  Global  Moran’s  I.  Simply,  it  
measures clustering at the local level and indicates, feature by feature, if a census tract is 
positively or negatively correlated with nearby census tracts. The test determines if there 
is a spatial cluster (of high or low values) or spatial outlier based on the expected 
distribution.  
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Buffalo 
 Tracts with a high number of affluent households near similar tracts, High/High, 
are located north of Interstate-90 near East Amherst. There is also a small group of 
High/High tracts near Orchard Park in the southern part of the metro area. In 2000, the 
area near East Amherst is the only area exhibiting spatial autocorrelation. The area near 
Orchard Park re-emerges after its hiatus in 2000. 
Cleveland 
 High/High clusters are located east of Cleveland in Shaker Heights and extend to 
further eastern suburbs. High/High tracts are also present near the western suburbs of 
Westlake, Bay Village and Rocky River. In 2000, there is little change on the east side, 
but a slight increase in the number of tracts in the previously discussed areas on the west 
side. In 2010, there is a split on the west side between Rocky River and growth further 
towards the periphery. On the east side, a bit of a checkerboard pattern emerges, but 
similar distribution to 2000. 
Detroit 
 Areas with high number of affluent households near similar tracts were located 
around Bloomfield, to the northwest of Detroit, and further north, in 1990. Bloomfield 
remains the core area of High/High tracts and there is growth to the northeast and 
southwest. The area to the southwest potentially is linked to  Ann  Arbor’s  economy,  
which is closer than Detroit. In 2010, there is continued growth around clusters observed 
in the previous decade. 
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Memphis 
 A linear pattern of High/High tracts extending from eastern Memphis to the 
southeast past Germantown is present in 1990. The pattern is apparent again in 2000 with 
some additional growth – extending north – east of Cordova. In 2010, there is a minor 
separation between the previously linked group and the most eastern section extends 
north. 
Austin 
 High-affluence neighborhoods are surrounded by high-affluence neighborhoods 
in the western part of Austin all three decades. In 1990, High/High tracts are located 
along western Austin and in 2000 the growth occurs further west. In 2010, growth 
continues along the western periphery to the southwest of the cluster observed in the 
previous decade. 
Denver 
 The cluster High/High neighborhoods in 1990 is located around the intersection 
of Interstate-225 and Interstate-25. Further, there is a cluster in southeast of downtown 
Denver near Washington Park. In 2000, High/High clusters move south and more clusters 
emerge in the southern area. Although it diminishes slightly, there is a similar pattern 
near Washington Park as well as growth on the western periphery. Finally, in 2010, the 
clusters in the southeastern part of Denver, and further south.  Finally, the area near 
Washington Park grows beyond its previous extent observed in 1990. 
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Seattle 
 In 1990, there are High/High clusters in downtown Seattle and the significant 
number of tracts is located in Bellevue, east of Seattle. Further, there are scattered 
High/Low tracts in the southern metro area, indicating there are a small number of tracts 
with high numbers of affluent households in an area generally characterized as having 
limited affluent households. The areas of High/High clusters extend to the north and east 
in 2000, while Low/Low tracts are prominent in the southern metropolitan area. The only 
slight change in 2010 is further eastward expansion of High/High tracts. 
Washington, DC 
 In 1990, High/High clusters are located northwest of DC, extending from central 
DC to Potomac. There are also small groups southwest of DC in Fairfax, VA; northwest 
in Brookeville, MD and west near Oakton, VA. In 2000, the northwest quadrant grows 
north, west and southwest towards Oakton to narrow the spatial gap. The areas near 
Fairfax and Brookeville both expand. Lastly, in 2010 there is continued growth to the 
west and near Fairfax. Low/Low clusters, signaling tracts with low numbers of affluent 
households are near areas with similar attributes, are present on the east side of DC near 
the fringe and inside I-495 in places such as Forest Heights, Temple Hills, Fairmont 
Heights and Tacoma Park. 
Getis Gi* 
Getis Gi* is the local test of Getis-Ord General G. The Gi* indicates hot-spots, or 
areas where there is spatial clustering of high values. The test also indicates cold-spots, 
which are areas were there is spatial clustering of low values. To be clear, cold-spots due 
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not signal poor areas, cold-spots only indicate clustering of tracts with low-numbers of 
affluent houses.  
Buffalo 
 In 1990, hot-spots of affluent households are northeast of Buffalo, extending from 
inside I-290 to East Amherst and in the south near Orchard Park. Although there is a 
reduction in tracts near Orchard Park, the same geographic patterns are present in 2000. 
In 2010, the hot-spots remain in similar locations and cold-spots appear east of downtown 
Buffalo. 
Cleveland 
 Hot-spots are found on the east side and west side of Cleveland. The eastern 
suburbs of Shaker Heights, Beachwood, Hunting Valley and near the western suburbs 
along the shore of Lake Erie in Rocky River and Bay Village. Cold-spots are found east 
of downtown. In 2000, the hot-spots on the west side expand further west and south. 
There is an increase in the number tracts experiencing hot-spots in 2000, but not a 
significant geographical shift. The intensity of cold-spots increases and expands to the 
south and east of the tracts observed in 1990. New cold-spots emerge south of Interstate-
90. In 2010, the cold-spots continue spreading and cover much of the central city while 
the hot-spots remain similar with some growth.  
Detroit 
 Detroit experiences hot-spots and cold-spots in 1990. Hot-spots, areas with 
clusters of tracts with high numbers of affluent households, are located around 
Bloomfield to the northwest of Detroit and near Grosse Point on Lake St. Clair just north 
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of downtown. Cold-spots, with low intensity, are located in downtown Detroit. In 2000, 
hot-spots extend northeast and southwest from Bloomfield and remain in Grosse Point. 
The cold-spots in downtown area expand geographically to the west and northwest and 
increase in intensity. These trends from 2000 to 2010 mimic those observed in the 
previous decade. By 2010, the cold-spots encompassing the downtown are as noteworthy 
and prominent as the hot-spots.  
Memphis 
 A linear pattern of hot-spots are present from east Memphis to Germantown in 
1990 and the same pattern persists in 2000, but there is a slight retreat away from 
Memphis. The core pattern persists in 2010 and the eastern boundary expands slightly 
north and south. 
Austin 
 As indicated via the concentrated affluence neighborhoods and Morans I, the hot-
spots of affluence are in the western part of the Austin metropolitan area near 
Rollingwood and West Lake Hills. The hot-spots perpetuate in this area in 2000 and there 
is some growth further west and north. Finally, in 2010 hot-spots remain in similar 
locations and expand to the south and west, in addition tracts to the north of Austin near 
Round Rock emerge. Further, isolated cold-spots indicating low number of affluent 
households emerge to the east of Interstate-35, primarily southeast of the city. 
Denver 
 Hot-spots are in the southeastern part of Denver and to the east of Interstate-25 
near Glendale to Colfax Avenue in 1990. There are similar patterns in 2000 and 
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additional growth to the southeast of the city as well as isolated cold spots throughout the 
city. In 2010, hot-spots perpetuate in similar areas as the previous two decades and there 
is additional growth in the southern metropolitan area. Further, cold-spots are located 
throughout Aurora and west of Interstate-25 from west Denver to Westminster. 
Seattle 
 In 1990, hot-spots are east of Seattle in Bellevue and in the western part of 
downtown Seattle with a few tracts to the north. The intensity of near downtown tracts 
increased in 2000 and there is growth south of downtown near the coast while the area 
near Bellevue expands north. In 2010, there is a similar distribution of hot-spots and 
continued expansion in east. Further, cold-spots emerge in Tacoma in the southern part of 
the Seattle Metropolitan area. 
Washington, DC 
 Hot-spots and cold-spots are present in Washington DC each decade. In 1990, 
hot-spots range from downtown DC to the northwest near Potomac, MD and to the 
southwest near Fairfax, VA. Cold-spots are located along the eastern half of DC 
extending in all directions. Most notably outside of DC is an area near Silver Springs, 
MD. In 2000, hot-spots remain in similar locations but increase south of the 1990 cluster 
– west of DC. A small hot-spot is located in Alexandria, VA to the south of DC, and west 
of the Potomac River. The cold-spots in 2000 remain and grow outwards with increased 
intensity in comparison to 1990. Finally, in 2010, the hot-spots continue spreading west 
of DC towards the periphery and continue to the southwest. The cold-spots intensify in 
the eastern half of DC and grow north, south and east of the clusters in 2000. Further, 
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isolated groups of cold-spots are north of DC near Gaithersburg in Kensington, just north 
of the beltway. 
Site Visits: Affluent Centers on the Periphery 
I visited two of the strong metropolitan areas, Austin and Denver, to compare 
neighborhoods that, according to the data, exhibited similar patterns. Affluent census 
tracts in Austin and Denver demonstrated relatively equal patterns of growth during the 
study period. In 1990, affluent neighborhoods constituted less than 1% of the census 
tracts and in 2010, each metro area had greater than 6%. Additionally, the affluent tracts 
observed in 1990 remained affluent throughout the study period, and the growth of 
wealthy neighborhoods over the past twenty years spread from these original 
neighborhoods. The neighborhoods I visited in Austin were Rollingwood and West Lake 
Hills, located in the western part of the Austin MSA. In Denver, I visited Cherry Hills 
Village, to the southeast of the city. No two neighborhoods are the same, yet the 
similarities between the neighborhoods, particularly neighborhoods over 900 miles apart, 
are striking. 
The obvious parallel was the fortification around neighborhoods, and to a lesser 
degree within the neighborhood, around the majority of homes. In some cases this 
fortification was evident through walls and gates, but at the very least, neighborhoods 
were separated by walls of urban forests and dense plantings. Illustrations are included in  
 119 
 
Figure 16: Denver, CO  Figure 17: Austin, TX 
 
 
Figure 18: Denver, CO  Figure 19: Austin, TX 
 
 
Figure 20: Denver, CO  Figure 21: Austin, TX 
 
 
Figure 22: Denver, CO  Figure 23: Austin, TX 
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Figures 16-19. Three other similarities were apparent: each neighborhood was anchored 
by a strong elementary school; well-maintained greenspace (Figures 20 & 21); and public 
signage was frequent, new, and detailed (Figures 22 & 23). These similarities are three 
public goods concentrated within a small number of neighborhoods. Arguably, public 
goods should be available to all members of a community, and not reserved for the 
affluent. Additionally, further examination may reveal the fortification around 
neighborhoods was supported with public money, illustrating an even greater divide 
between affluent and non-affluent neighborhoods.   
These similarities across different urban spaces reveal the benefits isolation offers 
affluent populations. Other patterns such as large homes, high-end cars, and well-
manicured lawns were also present, but those are all private market functions. The 
heightened quality of public goods recognizable in these neighborhoods compared to 
general observation throughout other neighborhoods of both cities is not the product of a 
democracy. While affluent neighborhoods clearly label the appropriate distance from a 
park along the highway (Figure 23), low-income neighborhoods lack greenspace of any 
type. Public goods are not being distributed equitably. 
These site visits were brief and only a small portion of this larger product, yet the 
similarities between these neighborhoods, the centers of affluence in both cities for the 
past twenty years, clearly demonstrate preconceived notions about the disparity between 
affluent and non-affluent neighborhoods.
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Chapter Five: Discussion 
The results illustrate the importance of methodology in segregation research. The 
different measures of segregation indicate unique patterns, and in some cases, different 
relationships altogether. Methodological differences aside, four broad conclusions can be 
garnered from this research. First, income segregation is increasing and the number of 
moderate-income neighborhoods is declining. Second, weaker metropolitan areas are 
more segregated by income than strong metropolitan areas. Third, opposing income 
extremes contribute to segregation in the two groups of metros: the segregation of 
poverty is higher in weaker metropolitan areas, while the segregation of affluence is 
higher in stronger metropolitan areas. Lastly, despite the suburbanization of poverty, 
poverty remains a near-urban phenomenon and is not being displaced by neighborhoods 
of affluence. 
Income Segregation Increases between 1990 and 2000 
 Income segregation increased between 1990 and 2010. In line with other scholars, 
there is an evaporation of middle class neighborhoods and it is attributable to the growing 
segregation of affluence (Reardon and Bischoff 2011a; Fry and Taylor 2012). There are 
an increasing percentage of neighborhoods classified as high- or extreme-income, and the 
isolation of affluence is growing. Aside from the dissimilarity index, all measures reveal 
an increasing segregation of affluence in the metropolitan areas examined. The statistical 
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approaches measuring the segregation of poverty present unique and inconsistent 
patterns, and the trends vary between groups. 
 The loss of moderate-income neighborhoods (those not classified as high- or 
extreme-poverty/affluence) is reflected in metropolitan areas exhibiting weak and strong 
growth. In 1990, the average percentage of high- or extreme-poverty neighborhoods for 
the eight metropolitan areas was 18.9% and the average percentage of high- or extreme-
affluence neighborhoods was .9%. In 2010, however, those percentages increased to 
25.2% and 5.7%, respectively, meaning the number of non high- or extreme-income 
neighborhoods decreased from 80.2% in 1990 to 69.1% in 2010.  
The isolation index also reveals an increase in segregation. The segregation of 
poverty is stagnant over the twenty-year period, but there is an increase in the segregation 
of affluence, indicating increased residential sorting among affluent households. Despite 
remaining high, the dissimilarity index indicates a decline in unevenness of both poverty 
and affluence over the twenty-year period. 
 These broad trends characterize the increase of income segregation for the eight 
metropolitan areas as a collective group. Additionally, this increased segregation is 
observed in each group of metropolitan areas; and to answer the direct research question, 
the increase of income segregation is greater in the weaker metropolitan areas.  
Weaker Metropolitan Areas Exhibit Greater Segregation 
 In contrast to my hypothesis, weaker metropolitan areas exhibit higher degrees of 
income segregation than stronger metropolitan areas. Weaker metropolitan areas saw the 
share of non high- or extreme-income neighborhoods decline from 74.8% in 1990 to 
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64.5% in 2010. In comparison, the percentage declined from 86.2% to 74.1% in stronger 
metropolitan areas. 
 The segregation indices present a similar, but more complex, relationship. 
Regarding the dissimilarity index, the weaker metropolitan areas have higher levels of 
unevenness in all three decades, for both poverty and affluence. The lower levels of 
unevenness  in  the  stronger  metropolitan  areas  align  with  Massey  and  Denton’s  (1993)  
discussion on racial segregation. Places with lower rates of minorities exhibit lower 
degrees  of  unevenness  because  neighborhood  composition  remains  within  the  majority’s  
tolerance and fears are muted due to lack of potential in-migration (Massey and Denton 
1993). The segregation of affluence is decreasing between 1990 and 2010 for both groups 
of metro areas. As for the segregation of poverty, the dissimilarity index is decreasing in 
the weaker metros, and increasing in the stronger metropolitan areas. The isolation index 
presents a mixed bag. The weaker metropolitan areas exhibit greater segregation of 
poverty than the stronger metropolitan areas, but the gap between the two groups 
narrowed over the twenty-year period. 
In each of these cases, the higher levels of income segregation in the weaker 
metropolitan areas are attributable to their legacy of higher segregation in 1990. Despite 
the weaker metropolitan areas higher income segregation, high- and low-income groups 
contribute to income segregation within the two groups of metros in considerably 
different ways.  The greater income segregation within weaker metropolitan areas is 
related to greater segregation of poverty, whereas the segregation of affluence is greater 
in the stronger metropolitan areas. 
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Segregation of Poverty is Higher in Weak Metros 
Weaker metropolitan areas have higher segregation of poverty than stronger 
metros. The encouraging news of poverty decline in the 1990s is reflected in the analysis 
(Jargowsky 2003). Unfortunately, the discouraging news indicating growth in poverty 
during the 2000s is also reflected in the analysis (Kneebone et al. 2010a). The segregation 
of poverty declined in the 1990s, but returned in the 2000s to surpass levels observed in 
1990. After a decline in extreme-poverty neighborhoods in the 1990s, the number 
increased in the 2000s beyond 1990 levels. The stronger metropolitan areas experience a 
decline in high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods in the 1990s, but the values 
observed in 2010 eclipsed 1990 levels. In weaker metropolitan areas a neighborhood is 
almost two times as likely to be considered high- or extreme-poverty (33.3% to 16.9% in 
2010). This disparity is amplified in extreme-poverty neighborhoods; 10.9% of 
neighborhoods are extreme-poverty in weaker metropolitan areas, and only 2.6% in 
stronger metropolitan areas. 
The segregation indices tell a similar story, but do reveal an interesting fact about 
the trends of the segregation of poverty. Examining the dissimilarity index or isolation 
index values, the weaker four metropolitan areas have higher values in all three decades 
however, the two groups are (slightly) trending in different directions. The weaker metros 
experienced a decline, and the stronger metros an increase, in both segregation indices 
between 1990 and 2010. 
This lower level of segregation of poverty in stronger metropolitan areas may be 
related to the growth of the high-income group, therefore diminishing the gap between 
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low-income and middle-income groups (Reardon and Bischoff 2011b). The growth, and 
accompanying segregation of affluence is reflected in the next section. 
Segregation of Affluence Higher in Strong Metros 
 The segregation of affluence is increased in both groups of metropolitan areas 
during the study period, but increased faster in the stronger metros. This increase of 
segregation is accompanied by a period of nearly all income growth occurring within 
high-income households (Fry and Taylor 2012). Consequently, the stronger metropolitan 
areas, which have an affluence rate twice that of the weaker metropolitan areas, has 
considerably higher segregation of affluence. Affluent households are more isolated in 
stronger metros and are four times as likely to have high- or extreme-affluence 
neighborhoods. Just as in the segregation of poverty, the dissimilarity index is an outlier. 
Otherwise, all measures – isolation index, high-, extreme-, and high-and extreme-
affluence neighborhoods – reveal a higher segregation of affluence in the stronger 
metropolitan areas.  
Segregation of Affluence v. Segregation of Poverty 
 Although recent research reveals higher levels of segregation of affluence than 
segregation of poverty, that cannot be confirmed in this study (Dwyer 2009; Reardon and 
Bischoff 2011a; Reardon and Bischoff 2011b: Fry and Taylor 2012). As stated above, the 
segregation of affluence is responsible for the increasing income segregation in the eight 
metropolitan areas – and each group – since 1990, but the isolation index and the number 
of high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods demonstrates greater segregation of poverty 
than affluence. As discussed earlier, the dissimilarity index bucks the trend. According to 
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the dissimilarity index, there is a greater unevenness between affluent and non-affluent 
populations than there is between poor and non-poor populations.  
The isolation values are similar, however, the number of high-and extreme-
affluence neighborhoods is a fraction compared to poverty neighborhoods. Potentially, 
this research contradicts with previous studies due to unique calculations of affluence. 
Reardon and Bischoff (2011a and 2011b) consider households in the 90th percentile of 
income as affluent. Fry and Taylor (2012) consider affluent households as those at twice 
the median household income. Given the gap between poverty and affluence rates 
included in this study, it is possible a more even distribution between the two income 
groups would result in higher segregation of affluence. Despite this likelihood, 
reclassifying income thresholds to make the distribution more even does not change the 
distribution of income it only changes the parameters with which we classify the income. 
Changing the classification would mute the current income disparities in the United 
States. 
Suburbanization of Poverty Remains “Near-urban” 
 The suburbanization of poverty may have dispersed from primary cities into 
neighboring jurisdictions, but low-income individuals remain clustered near urban 
centers. Broadly, the two local spatial statistics and high-poverty neighborhoods show 
poverty areas remain near large, urban centers. The majority of poverty observed beyond 
urban centers are located in two places: far on the periphery in places easily considered 
rural with little affiliation to the urban core, demonstrated in places such as Memphis and 
Austin; and secondly, in secondary cities outside of primary cities such as in Tacoma, 
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Washington; Aurora, CO; Erie, NY; and Silver Springs, MD. Locals may argue these 
places are urban centers, but in a classic central city-suburban area dichotomy, these 
places are often classified as suburbs in research. 
This conclusion does not offer a sharp contrast to existing literature on the 
suburbanization of poverty; rather it supports it and provides visual evidence of the 
location of poverty clusters. The suburbanization of poverty rhetoric may insinuate 
concentrations of poverty far from urban cores, but that is indicative of perceptions about 
suburban places rather than the actual location. The suburbanization of poverty indicates 
poverty is changing jurisdictional boundaries, and signals the importance of prescribing 
policies that meet the needs of low-income individuals in municipalities unequipped to 
meet the needs of this growing population. 
Additionally, in contradiction to my hypothesis, affluent neighborhoods did not 
emerge in the urban core to the degree I anticipated in the metropolitan areas investigated 
in this study. Austin, Seattle and Washington, DC, however, did experience a higher 
number of affluent neighborhoods near the central city in 2010 than in 1990. 
Additionally, there were instances where urban neighborhoods did transition from high-
poverty areas to no poverty over the twenty-year period in multiple metropolitan areas. 
These events occurred in places such as Austin and Washington, DC. Additionally, 
affluent  households  persisted  near  Denver’s  urban  core  in  the Washington Park 
neighborhood. These transitioning neighborhoods present interesting case studies for 
future research. On the periphery, many of the affluent neighborhoods served as 
epicenters for the growth of additional affluent neighborhoods. Future research can 
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investigate if urban neighborhoods complete the transition from poverty to affluent, and 
become centers of newly established pods of wealth.  
Spatial Statistics as an approach to segregation 
The local spatial statistics offer a unique platform to visualize clusters of 
segregation, however, they do not present a quantitative mechanism to easily demonstrate 
results beyond that visualization and interpretation. A unique corollary between Getis 
Gi*,  Local  Moran’s  I,  and  the  mapping  of  high- and extreme-income groups was the 
ability of the two local spatial statistics to highlight areas of future high- or extreme- 
poverty  and/or  affluence.  The  Local  Moran’s  I  or  Getis  Gi*  highlighted  areas  of  spatial  
clustering at one period that emerged as high- or extreme- income neighborhood in one of 
the subsequent decades. This is true for high poverty areas in Washington, DC and 
Seattle. It was more valuable, however, to visualize clusters of affluence. There were few 
neighborhoods classified as high- or extreme-affluence, particularly in 1990, yet clusters 
indicated by the spatial statistics emerged as areas of high-affluence by 2010 in metros 
such as Austin, Seattle, Denver, Memphis, and Washington, DC. Local spatial statistics 
prove to be a valuable asset towards visualizing the processes of segregation in a 
metropolitan area and also demonstrate a clear picture of where clusters take place. 
The global statistics, however, did not provide great insight into the spatial 
patterns of poverty or affluence. The high rate of statistical significant clustering failed to 
produce useful findings between the metropolitan areas. Further research should be 
incorporated to improve the selection of distance bands for segregation analysis.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 129 
Chapter Six: Conclusion 
This research yielded four conclusions. First, this study supports recent research 
suggesting income segregation is increasing. Second, weaker metropolitan areas 
experience higher income segregation than strong metropolitan areas. Third, weaker 
metropolitan areas have higher segregation of poverty while stronger metropolitan areas 
have higher segregation of affluence. Lastly, poverty remains a near-urban phenomenon 
and is not being displaced by neighborhoods of affluence. 
Income segregation is increasing due to the growing segregation of affluence. 
There is a consistent decline in the number of moderate-income neighborhoods in the 
metropolitan areas examined here, as neighborhoods of high- and extreme-poverty and 
affluence constitute larger shares of metropolitan areas. Overall, metropolitan areas with 
below average growth have higher levels of income segregation than metropolitan areas 
with strong growth rates. Low-income individuals are more segregated and more likely to 
live in an extreme-poverty neighborhood if they live in the weaker metropolitan areas.  
The gap between the two groups of metros, however, diminished between 1990 
and 2010. If successful metropolitan areas continue to attract affluent populations, this 
study suggests those affluent populations will continue to segregate at a faster rate than in 
metropolitan areas experiencing slower growth. Although weaker metropolitan areas 
experience higher levels of income segregation, it is important to note the consequences 
of high levels of the segregation of affluence. An increasing isolation of affluence signals 
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a potential isolation of the best public goods, such as schools, parks, greenspaces, and 
infrastructure (Reardon and Bischoff 2011a). If affluence continues to segregate, both 
low- and middle-income populations may experience ramifications. Ultimately, ensuring 
all populations have access to opportunity is the most important outcome. This research 
indicates low-income individuals are less likely to be segregated from other populations 
if they live in one of the stronger metropolitan areas.  
Future research initiatives should include a more in-depth analysis of each 
metropolitan area, examining both poverty and affluence. A qualitative approach may 
indicate perceptions about segregation and opportunity within each of the metropolitan 
areas. Further, an examination of local policies aimed at affordable housing or zoning 
policies may provide additional insight into segregation levels in each metropolitan area. 
From a quantitative approach, information on housing prices and ownership percentages 
within neighborhoods of affluence and poverty could provide further depth and improve 
understanding at the neighborhood and metropolitan scale. Investigating ways for weaker 
metropolitan areas to reduce the segregation of poverty is needed and crucial for future 
generations as successful metros attract greater shares of population and economic 
output. Lastly, further studies should focus on the segregation of affluence. Recent 
studies (Reardon and Bischoff 2011a; 2011b; Fry and Taylor 2012) indicate an increasing 
segregation of affluent populations, but potential solutions receive little attention. 
Although weaker metropolitan areas exhibit higher levels of income segregation, the 
segregation of affluence is increasing. If this pattern continues, it will soon outpace the 
segregation of poverty, regardless of measure.
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